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Formerly Manufacturing Entities:
Piercing the "Patent Troll" Rhetoric
KRISTEN OSENGA

Everyone hates patent trolls-those companies that "hijack somebody
else's idea" and use the patents to "extort some money" from companies
that actually make things. But, despite the rhetoric, not all patent trolls are
created equal. This Article is the first to focus on one type ofpatent trollthe formerly manufacturing entity. These patent trolls used to make or do
something in commerce, but now derive all or a significant portion of their
income through licensing their intellectual property. Using case study
analysis, this Article demonstrates that formerly manufacturing entities do
not impose the harms associated with patent trolls more broadly and, in
fact, provide unique benefits for commercialization of new technologies.
Specifically, formerly manufacturing entities do not "sneak up " on
manufacturing companies, waiting for them to invest extensively in a
technology before seeking a license. Rather, the technology and the patents
are already out in the open, having been practiced by the patent troll.
Further, because formerly manufacturing entities have already worked to
commercialize the technology, they are in a much better position to assess
its value, as well as the costs and risks associated with bringing it to
market. We should recognize the benefits formerly manufacturing entities
add to commercialization and, in the larger scheme, ensure that potential
patent reform measures and judicial solutions to the patent troll problem
are carefully drawn so as not to do more harm than good.
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Formerly Manufacturing Entities:
Piercing the "Patent Troll" Rhetoric
KRISTEN OSENGA•

I. INTRODUCTION

Everyone seems to hate "patent trolls." Although this term has
captured the public's imagination and the government's attention, it has
proven difficult to define, even by the academics whose work is widely
cited in support of the many criticisms of "patent trolls" today. 1 One often
hears that "patent trolls" are companies or individuals that use patents to
"extort some money" by filing lawsuits against manufacturing companies

• Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law. I am grateful for the extensive
comments provided by John Duffy, Eric Claeys, Michael Risch, Mark Schultz, Adam Mossoff, Ryan
Holte, Sean O'Connor, Stephen Yelderman, Christopher Beauchamp, Camilla Hrdy, Matt Barbian,
David Schwartz, Corinna Lain, and Jim Gibson. This Article was written with the generous support of a
Thomas Edison Innovation Fellowship from the George Mason University School of Law.
1
See, e.g., James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99
CORNELL L. REV. 387, 396 (2014) ("There is no consensus among researchers on the proper definition
of [non-practicing entity, or patent troll]."); Demand Letters and Consumer Protection: Examining
Deceptive Practices by Patent Assertion Entities: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Prat.,
Prod. Safety, & Ins. of the Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp., 113th Cong. 37 (2013) [hereinafter
Hearing] (statement of Adam Mossoff, Prof. of Law, George Mason Univ. Sch. of Law, and Senior
Scholar, Ctr. for the Pro!. of Intellectual Prop.) ("[T]here is no settled, agreed-upon definition of PAE
[i.e., patent assertion entity] or patent troll ....").
The Bessen & Meurer study is widely cited in the media and elsewhere for the nature and extent
of problems caused by "patent trolls." See, e.g., David Goldman, Patent Trolls Cost Inventors Half a
Trillion Dollars, CNN MONEY (Sept. 21, 2011, 5:19 AM), http://money.cnn.com/201 l/09
/21/technology/patent_troll_cost/ (citing the Bessen & Meurer study to support Goldman's assertion
that "patent trolls create a very large disincentive to innovate"); Dara Kerr, Patent Trolls Curb
Innovation and Cost the U.S. $ 29B in 2011, CNET (June 26, 2012, 5:41 PM),
http ://news.cnet.com/news/patent-trolls-curb-innovation-and-cost-the-u-s-29b-in-2011 I (citing the
Bessen & Meurer study to support the proposition that patent lawsuits are becoming more prevalent
and cost the United States $29 billion in 2011); Rebecca J. Rosen, Study: Patent Trolls Cost Companies
$ 29 Billion Last Year, ATLANTIC (June 29, 2012, 7:37 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/
technology/archive/2012/06/study-patent-trolls-cost-companies-29-billion-last-year/259070/ (using the
Bessen & Meurer study to support the assertion that patent trolls "buy up software patents, don't
actually try and develop any products or sell anything, and then just sue people left and right for patent
infringement").
The Bessen & Meurer study, however, is not without critics. See, e.g., David L. Schwartz & Jay
P. Kesan, Analyzing the Role of Non-Practicing Entities in the Patent System, 99 CORNELL L. REV.
425, 431-45 (2014) (systematically dismantling, throughout the entire article, many of Bessen &
Meurer's assertions and findings for both substantive and methodological failings).
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(called "practicing entities"). 2 In response to this public uproar, multiple
pieces of legislation have been proposed at the federal and state levels, 3
and even courts have responded to the rhetoric concerning "patent trolls.''4
For these reasons, such a lack of a settled definition is important, and it is
time to acknowledge this fact. It is time to replace rhetoric with reasoned
policy analysis. Consider one example. In June 2011, Finnish mobile
communications manufacturer, Nokia, settled a patent dispute with Apple. 5
At the time, this was heralded as a positive event. 6 In December 2012,
Nokia settled another patent dispute with Research in Motion (RIM). 7 This
too was seen as advantageous, especially for Nokia. According to Forbes
magazine, the company could use money from the settlement to "buy time
for its smart phone business to get back on its feet" and to "mitigate the
impact of what could be a lengthy Windows Phone transition process.''8
Fast-forward nine months to Nokia's agreement to license its patents to
2
President Obama made the "extortion" comment during a Google Hangout in response to a
question from "an entrepreneur," who expressed concerns about patent trolls and software patents. See
Ali Sternburg, Obama Acknowledges Patent Troll Problem [wl Transcript}, PATENT PROGRESS (Feb.
14, 2013), http://www.patentprogress.org/2013/02/14/obama-acknowledges-patent-troll-problem-wtranscript/ (citing an example of how President Obama perceives the actions of patent trolls). See also
Dustin Volz, White House on Patent Trolls: It's Your Turn, Congress, NAT'L J. (Feb. 21, 2014),
http://www.nationaljournal.com/tech/white-house-on-patent-trolls-it-s-your-turn-congress-20140221
(reporting on the White House's new executive actions designed to deter abuse of the patent system
and combat patent trolls).
3
Federal legislative initiatives include, among many others, the Innovation Act, H.R. 3309, I 13th
Cong. (2013) (enacted), the Patent Transparency and Improvements Act of 2013, S. 1720, I 13th Cong.
(2013), and the Saving High-Tech Innovators from Egregious Legal Disputes Act of2013, H.R. 845,
I 13th Cong. (2013). State legislation includes Bad Faith Assertions of Patent Infringements, VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 9, §§ 4195-99 (2013), and S.B. 1540, 77th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2014) (enacted).
4
Two cases were argued before the Supreme Court in 2014 that involved issues related to patent
trolls, such as standards for fee-shifting in patent infringement cases. See Highmark v. All care Health
Mgmt. Sys., 134 S. Ct. 1744, 1749 (2014) ("[A]n appellate court should apply an abuse-of-discretion
standard in reviewing all aspects of a district court's [Patent Act] § 285 determination."); Octane
Fitness v. Icon Health & Fitness, 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1752 (2014) (stating that under§ 285 of the Patent
Act, the court may award reasonable attorneys fees to the prevailing party in exceptional cases).
5
See, e.g., Press Release, Nokia, Nokia Enters into Patent License Agreement with Apple (June
14, 2011, 8:05 AM), available at http://company.nokia.com/en/news/press-releases/2011/06/14/nokiaenters-into-patent-license-agreement-with-apple ("This settlement demonstrates Nokia's industry
leading patent portfolio and enables us to focus on further licensing opportunities in the mobile
communications market.").
6
See, e.g., Florian Mueller, Apple and Nokia Settle Patent Dispute-See I Told You So: Apple
Pays, FOSS PATENTS (June 14, 2011, 7:09 AM), http://www.fosspatents.com/2011/06/apple-andnokia-settle-patent-dispute.htrnl ("This [settlement] frees up resources for both Apple and Nokia.").
7
Press Release, Nokia, Nokia and RlM Enter into New Patent License Agreement (Dec. 21,
2012), available at http://press.nokia.com/2012/12/21 /nokia-and-rim-enter-into-new-patent-licenseagreement; see also Trefis Team, RIM Settlement Shows There is Value in Nokia's Patents, FORBES
(Jan. 2, 2013, 4: 15 PM), www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2013/01/02/rim-settlement-showsthere-is-value-in-nokia s-patents/?utrn_medium=referral&utm_source=t.co (noting that Nokia and
RlM's agreement enables Nokia to dedicate its efforts to "furthering licensing opportunities in the
mobile communications market").
8
Trefis Team, supra note 7.
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Microsoft in September 2013. 9 Now, instead of being celebrated, the
agreement resulted in Nokia being branded as a "patent troll." 10 In all three
instances, the same company licensed its patents to various manufacturing
companies. Yet only the third license made people revile Nokia as a
"patent troll." Why does a licensing business model cause concern simply
because the company that owns the intellectual property no longer employs
a manufacturing business model as well?
This question is not one of idle curiosity or academic musing,
especially given that widespread criticism of the licensing business model
is driving real-world legislation and court decisions. Even many academics
employing this term--0r its synonyms, such as "non-practicing entity" or
"patent assertion entity"-fail to acknowledge the existence of differing
business models in the innovation industries that bring patented technology
(such as smart phones and tablets) to the marketplace. 11 Initially, the bulk
of scholarship and broader public commentary appears to be anti-"patent
troll"; however, scholarship and broader public commentary are nondifferential about what or who should be classified as a "patent troll." 12
Very few articles consider that the companies and individuals falling
9
Press Release, Microsoft, Microsoft to Acquire Nokia's Devices & Services Business, License
Nokia's Patents and Mapping Services (Sept. 3, 2013), available at http://www.microsoft.com/enus/news/press/2013/sep 13/09-02announcementpr.aspx.
10
See, e.g., Brian Fung, Is Nokia About to Become a Patent Troll?, WASH. POST BLOG (Sept. 3,
2013 ), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/09/03/is-nokia-about-to-become-apatent-troll/ (noting that Nokia resembles a patent troll because it is "[s]elling Microsoft its smartphone
business [to] clear the way for Nokia to enforce its patents more aggressively"); Mike Masnick, What's
Left of Nokia Poised to Become a Giant Patent Troll, TECHDIRT (Sept. 10, 2013, 8:58 PM),
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/2013 0907/23 551524443/whats-left-nokia-poised-to-become-giantpatent-troll.shtml (noting that a mischaracterization of the Nokia-Microsoft deal, which shows that
Microsoft paid $7 .2 billion to buy Nokia, may portray Nokia as being a "massive, annoying patent
troll").
11
Christopher A. Cotropia et al., Unpacking Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs), 99 MINN. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2014), available at papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers. cfin?abstract_id=2346381 (noting that
previous patent assertion entity studies failed to look "beyond the simple PAE or non-PAE"
distinction).
12
See, e.g., Bessen & Meurer, supra note 1, at 3 87, 396 ("It is surely difficult to attempt to
distinguish 'good' from 'bad' [trolls] .... ");Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The
Complex Patent Ecosystem and Its Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297, 300, 320
(2010-2011) (stating that patent trolls were seen as "entities that use their patents primarily to get
licensing fees rather than to support the development or transfer of technology," but now there are
"many kinds of entities, each with its own ... patent strategy," and noting that it is now hard to
distinguish between good and bad trolls); Sara Jeruss et al., The America Invents Act 500: Effects of
Patent Monetization Entities on US Litigation, 11 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 357, 366 (2012) ("There ...
has been considerable disagreement about the type of entity to include in the category of 'nonpracticing entity."'); Brian J. Love, An Empirical Study of Patent Litigation Timing: Could a Patent
Term Reduction Decimate Trolls Without Harming Innovators?, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1309, 1314-15
(2013) (noting the difficulty in determining whether "patent trolls" are "extortionists" or helpers in
disseminating useful technology); Jason Rantanen, Slaying the Troll: Litigation as an Effective
Strategy Against Patent Threats, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 159, 163--M (2006)
(noting "the difficulty of defining exactly what a patent troll is").
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within the scope of this pejorative label represent wide-ranging and
differing entities and business models. 13
This is a significant gap in the scholarship which need~ to be remedied.
Thus, this Article takes the first steps toward rectifying this problem. This
Article examines several commercial entities that were once manufacturers
but now devote all or a significant portion of their business . model to
licensing their patented innovation. In avoiding the inherent problems
identified above in the rhetorical epithet "patent troll," this Article instead
refers to these types of companies as "formerly manufacturing entities."
(For the same reasons, this Article will also use the term "licensing
business model" instead of the "troll" label.) Examples of formerly
manufacturing entities include IBM, 14 MOSAID (now Conversant), 15 and
General Electric. General Electric continues to make products, but also
engages in extensive licensing of its large patent portfolio, including many
patents covering technology that it does not manufacture. 16 It is
unsurprising, given the lack of precision in the rhetoric, that these
companies have been attacked as "patent trolls," despite their past or
ongoing commitment to manufacturing. 17
As a first step in developing more rigorous scholarship on the patent
licensing business model, this Article uses case studies to analyze formerly
manufacturing entities. These case studies make two important
13
See, e.g., John R. Allison et al., Extreme Value or Trolls on Top? The Characteristics of the
Most-Litigated Patents, 158 U. PA. L. REV. I, JO tbLI (2009) (identifying twelve classes of patent
plaintiffs, including eleven non-practicing entities); Cotropia et al., supra note 11 (defining different
categories of patent assertion entities); Mark A. Lemley & A Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest
for the Trolls, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2126--27 (2013) (identifying three troll business models);
James F. McDonough III, Comment, The Myth of the Patent Troll: An Alternative View of the
Function of Patent Dealers in an Idea Economy, 56 EMORY L.J. 189, 192-93 (2006) (identifying three
very general types of patent trolls); Schwartz & Kesan, supra note I, at 426 (noting that the group of
patent holders deemed "non-practicing entities" is quite heterogeneous).
14
See, e.g., David Kirkpatrick, The Future of IBM, FORTUNE, Feb. 18, 2002, at 62, 63, 65 (noting
that IBM was originally only competing at the product level, however "[t]hroughout the Gerstner years
IBM has been the world leader in new patents; it earns well over $1 billion a year licensing those
patents").
15
See, e.g., Our Portfolio, CONVERSANT, www.conversantip.com/our-portfolio/ (last visited Aug.
29, 2014) (noting that Conversant originally developed semiconductor and computer memory
technology but now focuses on licensing its intellectual property portfolio).
16
See, e.g., Richard Goldstein, GE's IP Counsel Takes a Surprising Position on So-Called
"Patent Trolls'', RICH GoLDSTEIN (Apr. 8, 2013), http://richgoldstein.com/2013/04/08/ge-ip-counseltakes-a-surprising-position-on-patent-trolls/ (noting that GE does not "necessarily make a product for
every patent they eventually assert against another entity").
17
See, e.g., Ben Kepes, IBM's New Strategies - Patent Trolling and Dodgy Advertising, FORBES
(Nov. 4, 2013 2:39 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/benkepes/2013/J 1/04/ibms-new-strategiespatent-trolling-and-dodgy-advertising/ (alleging that some of IBM's business decisions constitute
patent trolling); Stacey Vanek Smith, You May be Surprised Who Is a 'Patent Troll', MARKETPLACE
(June 4, 2013, 2:16 PM), http://www.marketplace.org/topics/tech/you-may-be-surprised-who-patenttroll (noting that big technology companies such as GE "use software patents to sue little technology
companies").
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contributions to the existing literature on the licensing business model.
First, they establish that there are in fact numerous types of commercial
entities and business models in the innovation industries. This Article
provides some much-needed data on this vital point about the
commercialization of patented innovation. Second, as a byproduct of the
first point, the case studies suggest that scholars should be more precise
than they have been thus far in identifying specific business models and
commercial practices before they broadly condemn any companies or
commercial activities. At a minimum, this Article serves as a reminder that
different business models create different costs and benefits in the
commercialization of patented innovation. Thus, normative assessments, as
well as legislative or judicial changes in the law, should not be made on the
basis of ill-defined and empirically unverified rhetoric. 18
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II reviews current thinking on
the licensing business model, explains the relationship between patents and
commercialization, and then connects the two to explore the effects of the
licensing business model on commercialization. Part III explains why the
case-study method is the proper tool for this analysis. It then details the
case studies, which are based on researching several formerly
manufacturing entitles and interviewing representatives of these
companies. Part III concludes with observations about what these formerly
manufacturing entities have in common and provides additional
illustrations of these common features. Part IV discusses some legal and
policy implications that follow from these case studies, redefines
"commercialization," and demonstrates how formerly manufacturing
entities provide unique benefits for commercialization, such as greater
market efficiencies from disclosures of patents previously owned by
individuals or small entities, and better valuation of patented innovation in
the marketplace. This Article concludes with suggestions of some potential
broader implications and identifies directions for future research.
II. PATENTS, LICENSING, AND COMMERCIALIZATION

Before delving into how formerly manufacturing entities represent one
type of the licensing business model, it is important to understand the
history of the "patent troll" label as applied to the licensing business
model. It is also important to understand the licensing business model
generally and the commercial context of why companies who used to
manufacture products would then shift to licensing. In addition, this Part
provides a detailed discussion of commercialization and the role of patents
in converting inventions created in garages or in research and development
18
See, e.g., Hearing, supra note 1, at 37, 38, 43 (failing to find a settled definition or a
scientifically substantive study that has proven an actual problem by the patent licensing model).
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departments into actual products and services sold to consumers in the
marketplace. This Part's conclusion connects these points by explaining
both sides of the policy debate over patent licensing: either licensing
hinders commercialization or it facilitates bringing new products to market.
A. The Birth and Expansion of the "Patent Troll" Label

As noted in the introduction, there is no settled definition of a "patent
troll." 19 The term is explicitly pejorative in whatever context it is defined
or used; the companies or individuals so labeled are accused of harming
innovation or the economy generally. 20 Before presenting the case studies,
a very brief review of the "patent troll" debate is helpful to establish how
this epithet has grown more expansive over time and now encompasses the
formerly manufacturing entities surveyed later in this Article.
The story of the "patent troll" begins fairly innocuously, if not
ironically. The term was first coined in 2001 by Peter Detkin, thenassistant general counsel for Intel Corporation, to describe an entity that
made money from patent licensing (entered into directly or after litigation),
as opposed to developing, manufacturing, and selling the patented
technology. 21 At the time, Detkin was referring to TechSearch LLC, a
patent licensing firm that had recently sued Intel. 22 Today, Detkin is a co-

19

Bessen & Meurer, supra note I, at 396 & n. 43.
See, e.g., id. at 397; Robin Feldman & Thomas Ewing, The Giants Among Us, 2002 STAN.
TECH. L. REV. I, I (2012), http://stlr.stanford.edu/pdf/felman-giants-among-us.pdf ("Troll activity is
generally reviled by operating companies as falling somewhere between extortion and a drag on
innovation."); Lemley & Melamed, supra note 13, at 2124 ("[T]rolls cost the economy $500 billion
over the last twenty years, mostly in the IT industry. Other reports suggest that patent trolls inhibit
innovation at the firms they sue."); Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341,
368, 384 (2010) ("[Patent trolls] tend to exploit litigation and licensing market defects to extract
unwarranted rents from commercializers .... ").
21
Brenda Sandburg, Trolling for Dollars, RECORDER, July 30, 2001, at I; Susan Hansen, The
'Original Patent Troll' Is Back With a New NPE Venture, CASCADESVENTURES (Sept. 14, 2012),
http://cascadesventures.com/press/4/original-patent-troll-back-new-npe-venture (noting that previouslytermed "patent troll" companies-which are now-termed "nonpracticing entities"-specialize in
securing patent licensing deals as opposed to actually manufacturing products).
22
See Sandburg, supra note 21 (noting that Detkin originally referred to TechSearch LLC as a
"patent extortionist," but chose "patent troll" as an alternative when TechSearch added libel to their
complaint).
Recently, Detkin explained that many people have misunderstood his original statement about
TechSearch. See Patrick Anderson, Do NPEs "Cost" Us $29 B? Intellectual Venture's Co-Founder
Peter Detkin Sets the Record Straight, GAMETIME IP (June 28, 2012), http://gametimeip.com/2012
/06/28/do-npes-cost-us-29-b-intellectual-ventures-co-founder-peter-detkin-sets-the-record-straight/
(quoting Peter Detkin as saying '"[w]hen I coined the term 'troll' more than 10 years ago I was talking
about people who take specious patents that were likely invalid and asserted them broadly across an
industry to extract nuisance value settlements."').
20
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founder and vice-chairman of Intellectual Ventures, a company that has
been called "Patent Troll Public Enemy # 1. " 23
Since 2001, the definition of "patent troll" has vastly expanded,
although the reasons for this expansion and the conflicting definitions are
not exactly clear. For example, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
labels "patent assertion entities" as "firms whose business model primarily
focuses on purchasing and asserting patents."24 However, a recent law
review article by Mark Lemley and Douglas Melamed defines "patent
trolls" as "patent owners whose primary business is collecting money from
others that allegedly infringe their patents. "25 The FTC' s adoption of the
allegedly more genteel term "patent assertion entity"26 was based on the
work of Colleen Chien, who coined and defined this phrase as a company
whose primary business is to assert patents.27 She explicitly excludes
universities and startups from this definition, contrary to James Bessen and
Michael J. Meurer's definition of their similar term, "non-practiGing
entity."28 Although the FTC adopted her phrase, Chien's definition does
not include the requirement of purchasing patents. Notably, Lemley and
Melamed's definition also does not require either the purchase of patents
for the sake of licensing or the lack of development of the patented
technology by the asserting entity. 29 Despite these various and conflicting
23
Gene Quinn, Intellectual Ventures Becomes Patent Troll Public Enemy #1, IP WATCHDOG
(Dec. 9, 2010, I :39 PM), http://ipwatchdog.com/2010/12/09/intellectual-ventures-becomes-patent-trollpublic-enemy-l/id=l3711; see also When Patents Attack! Transcript, THIS AMERICAN LIFE (July 22,
2011 ),
http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/44 l/when-patents-attack
("[B]log
IPWatchdog called Intellectual Ventures patent troll public enemy number one.").
24
FED. TRADE COMM'N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE AND
REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION, 8 & n.5 (Mar. 2011) (emphasis added), available at http://www.ftc.gov
/os/2011/03/110307/patent report.pdf.
25
Lemley & Melamed, supra note 13, at 2118. Economic literature utilizes a similar definition.
See Julien Penin, Strategic Uses of Patents in Markets for Technology: A Story of Fabless Firms,
Brokers, and Trolls, 84 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 633, 633 (2012) (''NPEs are firms that rarely or never
practice their patents, and instead focus on earning licensing fees.").
26
Hearing, supra note I, at 37. Additionally, "patent troll," "patent assertion entity'', and "nonpracticing entity" are all terms that have been used to describe the firms engaged in licensing business
models. It is generally accepted that "patent troll" is derogatory; others find "patent assertion entity"
derogatory because it infers a business model based on litigation (assertion). "Non-practicing entity" is
a bit more neutral. However, it is often viewed as overly inclusive because, on its face, it includes
universities, research institutions, and other licensing organizations that have not found disfavor.
27
Colleen Chien, Patent Trolls by the Numbers, SANTA CLARA L. FAC. PUBL'NS (Mar. 13, 2013),
http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/facpubs/609/; see also Lemley & Melamed, supra note 13, at 212627 (listing the three types of patent trolls).
28
Id. This is a shift from an earlier, more restrained definition by Chien, who said, "The term
NPE generally refers to a patentee that does not make products or 'practice' its inventions. Over time,
the definition has narrowed to exclude actors in the innovation enterprise who engage in significant
research and development activities and individual inventors who seek to commercialize their
inventions." Colleen V. Chien, Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths, and Kings: Narratives and Evidence in the
Litigation a/High-Tech Patents, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1571, 1577-78 (2009).
29
Lemley & Melamed, supra note 13, at 2118.
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definitions of what constitutes a "patent troll," one thing on which they all
seem to agree is that the company's income-or at least a substantial
portion of income--comes from licensing patents rather than inventing,
building, or selling something to consumers. 30
As the definition of the "patent troll" moniker has expanded to cover
all types of licensing business models, the number and types of companies
that fall within the scope of this pejorative label has expanded as well.
Previously, companies that made or sold products were exempt from the
"patent troll" label, even if their business models were based in part on
licensing. For example, a 2011 article observed without condemnation that
computer giant IBM "became famous for flexing its huge patent portfolio
to force companies to fork over some cash."31 It is noteworthy that the
article followed the FTC definition and did not label IBM as a "patent
troll," thus differentiating IBM from the commercial entities that only "buy
up and leverage patent portfolios for licensing fees." 32 But with the
expanded definition of this term, IBM is now often attacked as a "patent
troll."33
With the increased breadth of the patent troll definition, however, even
commercial firms that currently invent, manufacture, or sell products to
consumers have fallen victim to this epithet. 34 Many people, for instance,
might be surprised that "patent troll # 1"-Intellectual Ventures-actually
employs hundreds of full-time inventors to create new products and

30

Not all licensing business models involve large patent portfolios. For example, Lemley and
Melamed describe one type of patent troll who seeks to litigate and win a big victory on one strong
patent. See Lemley & Melamed, supra note 13, at 2126 ("The first and most traditional model is a
company that owns a patent and hopes to strike it big in court."). Other trolls, however, do base their
licensing models on large portfolios of patents, either in one sector of technology or across many
technology areas. See id. ("A final group of trolls is engaged in the business of patent aggregation.").
31
James Temple, Patent-Lawsuit Offensive Can Be Patently Offensive, S.F. CHRON., July 31,
2011, at DI.
32
Id. (emphasis added).
33
Despite the 2011 article, see supra note 31, others have been more willing to deem IBM a
patent troll. See, e.g., Joseph N. Hosteny, Litigators Corner: Is IBM a Patent Troll?, INTELL. PROP.
TODAY, May 2006, at 26 (comparing IBM's methods of obtaining and licensing patents similar to the
individuals "excoriated ... as trolls"); see also Adam Mossoff, The Nadir of "Patent Troll" Rhetoric,
CPIP BLOG (Nov. 13, 2013), http://cpip.gmu.edu/2013/11/13/the-nadir-of-patent-troll-rhetoric/ ("This
reveals the absurdities we've reached today in the patent policy debates, when, by the very terms of the
critics of the patent licensing business model, we can no longer differentiate between 100-year-old
firms who have long served an important commercial role in the innovation industries, such as IBM,
and the companies that the critics are in fact complaining about, such as Personal Audio (podcasting
patent) and Lodsys (online payment and feedback).").
A book has been written about IBM's changing business model. See generally LoUIS V.
GERSTNER, JR., WHO SAYS ELEPHANTS CAN'T DANCE: INSIDE IBM'S HISTORIC TURNAROUND (2002).
34
See Bessen & Meurer, supra note 1, at 395 (including, within their definition of patent trolls,
"operating companies asserting patents well outside the area in which they make products and
compete").
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services, recreating in the twenty-first century Thomas Edison's
nineteenth-century invention of an invention factory business model. 36 It is
therefore· unsurprising that formerly manufacturing entities that are no
longer making or selling something, but instead are licensing or asserting
patents, have also run afoul of the "patent troll" label.
B. Patent Licensing and Commercialization

As should be clear, the single attribute that unites all of the varying and
sometimes conflicting definitions of a "patent troll" is that it is an
individual or company that has adopted a licensing business model
(through either direct negotiations or settlement of patent infringement
lawsuits). This is why the expansion of the "patent troll" label includes
formerly manufacturing entities, as they now license their patented
innovation. To fully understand the licensing business model, it is first
necessary to frame the context in which it exists: as just one business
model in the commercialization of patented innovation.
Broadly speaking, commercialization is simply the process of
introducing a new product or process to the market. 37 As a practical matter,
however, commercialization of an invention is anything but simple; it
involves many follow-on innovative or risky financial steps between the
generation of an idea and the provision of an actual product to the market
and consumers. First, the invention must be transformed from an idea into
some sort of marketable embodiment of that idea. 38 Second, facilities to
mass-produce the marketable embodiment must be created, contracted
with, and configured. 39 Third, channels for distributing the marketable
embodiment to the relevant consumer must be arranged. 4 Finally,
consumers must be made aware of the existence and availability of the new

°
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See Intellectual Ventures Corporate Fact Sheet, INTELL. VENTURES (2013), http://www.
intellectualventures.com/assets_docs/IV_Corporate_Fact_Sheet_2. pdf (asserting that Intellectual
Ventures has more than "4,000 active inventors and 400 universities and institutions in [its]
international network").
36
See Adam Mossoff, Thomas Edison Was a "Patent Troll'', SLATE (May 19, 2014),
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/history_ of_innovation/2014/05/thomas_ edison_ charles_good
year_and_elias_ho weJr_were_patent_trolls.single.html (stating Edison should have continued
"inventing in his lab and selling or licensing his patents to others to manufacture and sell his innovative
products" rather than embark on generally unsuccessful business ventures).
37
For a term that is frequently and flippantly tossed about, commercialization is rarely given a
precise or illuminating definition. For one definition, see U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECH.
ASSESSMENT, OTA-BP-ITC-165, INNOVATION AND COMMERCIALIZATION OF EMERGING TECH. 2
(1995) ("Commercialization" [is] the attempt to profit from innovation through the sale or use of new
products, processes, and services.") (emphasis in original).
38
See, e.g., F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions,
85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 707--08 (2001) ("The invention must be developed into some commercial
embodiment.").
39
Id. at 708.
40 Id.
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product. Moreover, each of these steps requires its own additional
resources in the form of both capital and labor. 42
As the initial creator of the new product (or first-mover) expends these
resources to get the product to market, there will be other participants
(second-movers) competing to obtain a share of the market. 43 Some
expenses are borne by both first-movers and second-movers, such as
obtaining and configuring production facilities. 44 There is a wealth of
literature, however, that touts "second-mover advantages.'.45 Secondmovers will be exempt from some of the costs because they can rely on
resources spent by the first-mover. 46 For example, the efforts put in by the
first-mover to make consumers aware of the existence of a new product
will not need to be fully replicated by a second-mover, who only needs to
let the consumer know that they have the same product available. 47 A
second-mover also has non-resource based advantages over a first-mover
competitor, including risk aversion or avoidance based on the observed
success (or failure) of the first-mover. 48
The patent system steps in to encourage commercialization by
providing the first-mover with its own advantages. 49 A patent gives the
first-mover a property right in an invention. 50 This property right can
"provide an incentive to invest risk capital for commercialization ...
considered to be 'usually the most expensive part of the long haul"' from

Id.
Id.
43
See id. (stating that second movers will "subsequently move to compete at each step of the
larger endeavor").
44 Id.
45
See Sichelman, supra note 20, at 373 (stating that there is ample literature on advantages
"whereby a follower is able to reap the benefits of a first-mover's efforts at a much lower cost").
46
See Kieff, supra note 38, at 708 ("Some costs, however, will be borne only by the first mover,
because once incurred they will yield benefits for the entire class of competitors, embracing first
movers and second movers.").
47
See id. at 709 ("Similarly, the education of consumers and arousal of consumer demand will
benefit all competitors equally.").
48
See id. ("[A] second mover's mere knowledge of a first mover's success eliminates a great deal
of risk from the second mover's decision whether to embark on the same enterprise. The mere
knowledge that a problem has been solved may provide psychological motivation to attempt a
solution.").
49
See Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who's Afraid of the APA? What the Patent System
Can Learn from Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269, 274-75 (2007) ("[M]ost patent scholars would
agree that patents can, and should, be used in some measure to promote both invention and
commercialization."); see also Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20
J.L. & ECON. 265, 276 (1977) (advancing the prospect theory for the patent system based on promoting
commercialization).
50
See 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2012) ("[P]atents shall have the attributes of personal property."); Festo
Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 730 (2002) ("The [patent] monopoly
is a property right .... ").
41

44
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idea to market. In particular, the first-mover is able to exclude
competition for a limited time, allowing him to potentially charge a higher
price to procure recoupinent of costs. 52 Without this exclusive period, the
patentee must compete with a second-mover, who has fewer costs to
recoup and who can charge less without losing profitability; the patentee
may have to charge a lower price to remain competitive. 53 At the lower
price, the first-mover/patentee may not be able to fully recapture his costs
of invention and commercialization. 54
Most discussions about the commercialization process focus only on
firms that bring a product from idea to market as one entity, or companies
that are vertically integrated. However, manufacturing today often involves
vertically disintegrated entities; in these cases, patent protection is even
more necessary. 55 Patents facilitate entry of specialized firms (or inventors)
upstream, which pass along new ideas .to specialized producers (or
commercializers) downstream to allow for specialization gains, as well as
upstream and downstream economies of scale. 56 Without patent protection,
the transfer of an idea from inventor to producer is unlikely due to Arrow's
information paradox. 57
The property right afforded by a patent is important for several
reasons. First, the exclusive right granted to the owner protects the firstmover inventor and allows for information transfer. In addition, it allows
for injunctive relief to potentially be rewarded as a remedy for patent
infringement. 58 This provides a credible threat, ideally deterring second51

See Kieff, supra note 38, at 743 (internal citation omitted).
See Adam Mossoff, Exclusion and Exclusive Use in Patent Law, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 321,
327-28 (2009) (discussing a patent's right of exclusion); see also Christopher A. Cotropia, What Is the
"Invention"?, 53 WM. & MARYL. REV. 1855, 1898-99 (2012) ("As the story goes, price control via
patent exclusivity allows the inventor to recoup her investment.").
53
See Kieff, supra note 38, at 710 n.62 (providing reasons why patents' right to exclude provides
incentives for patentees to bear the initial costs).
54
See id. (reasoning that without the right to exclude, a patentee would face losing all sales to a
competitor unless they lower their prices, which may not lead to the recovery of initial costs of
innovation or future marginal and fixed costs); Cotropia, What Is the "Invention"?, supra note 52, at
1894 (''Not needing to worry about competitors who might charge less for the same invention, the
inventor can charge more than merely the cost of materials and time it takes to make each commercial
embodiment of the invention. This additional money allows her to recover her sunk costs and turn a
profit.").
55
See, e.g., Jonathan M. Barnett, Intellectual Property as a Law of Organization, 84 S. CAL. L.
REV. 785, 819 (2011) ("[P]atents act as the catalyst that can set off a typical observed sequence of
progressive disintegration .... ").
56
See id at 819-20 (describing the "sequence of progressive disintegration").
57
See id. at 798 ("As Arrow observed, the idea seller will decline to bargain with the idea buyer
given the buyer's rational unwillingness to purchase an idea without disclosure.").
58
See, e.g., Karen E. Sandrik, Reframing Patent Remedies, 67 U. MIAMI L. REV. 95, 108 (2012)
("[T]he Supreme Court explained that patents are property and that patent holders should accordingly
in most instances be entitled to permanent injunctive relief.") (citing Cont'! Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper
Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 429-30 (1908)). Injunctive relief is available even for non-practicing patent
52
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movers from copying or otherwise infringing the first-mover's invention.
Nonetheless, infringers may still have other options. 59 Some scholars have
theorized that the availability of injunctive relief creates the potential for
"holdup" by patent-owners, 60 although there is yet to be published any
empirical study confirming that "holdup" is a systemic problem in the
innovation economy. 61
Although patents serve as legal mechanisms aiding the
commercialization of innovative technology, the design of the patent
system places a kink in the pipeline from idea to marketable product.
Specifically, patent law encourages early filing of patent applications. 62
However, the pressure to file early means that inventors may file
applications before knowing about a product's potential commercial
success, let alone its final marketable configuration. 63 Thus, patents with
early filed applications might never become commercialized; 64 or, if the
owners, see Cont'/ Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. at 429, though the automatic availability of a permanent
injunction has changed following the Supreme Court's decision in eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.,
547 U.S. 388, 390, 394 (2006).
59
See, e.g., John M. Golden, Injunctions as More (or Less) than "Off Switches": PatentInfringement Injunctions' Scope, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1399, 1418 (2012) ("Despite the issuance of an
injunction, an adjudged infringer can continue to have a multiplicity of plausible options .... ").
60
See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L.
REV. 1991, 1993 (2007) ("[T]he threat of injunction can enable a patent holder to negotiate
royalties far in excess of the patent holder's true economic contribution.").
61
See, e.g., Alexander Galetovic et al., Patent Holdup: Do Patent Holders Holdup Innovation?
11-14 (Hoover IP2 Working Paper Series, No. 14011, 2014), available at http://media.hoover.org
/sites/default/files/GaletovicHaberLevine%20Working"/o20Paper.pdf (discussing "[t]estable implications of the patent holdup conjecture" and finding "neither primafacie evidence of holdup nor of the
validity. of the patent holdup conjecture"); Stephen Haber & Ross Levine, The Myth of the Wicked
Patent Troll, WALL ST. J., June 30, 2014, at All (asserting that the increase in the number of patent
lawsuits since 2000 may "reflect a healthy, dynamic economy'').
The argument that there is a "holdup" problem caused by patent licensing companies is a central
feature of the attacks on "patent trolls" today. See, e.g., Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 60, at 2010
(disagreeing with the Federal Circuit Court's assertion in MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc. that
"'additional leverage in licensing' is 'a natural consequence of the right to exclude and not an
inappropriate reward' to a patentee") (quoting MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323,
1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005), vacated and remanded, 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006)); Sandrik, supra note 58, at 97
("[P]atent commentators are most concerned when NPEs strategically delay in agreeing to license their
technology in hopes of demanding a royalty that not only reflects the value of the patented technology,
but also a premium for holding out."). See generally Colleen V. Chien & Mark A. Lemley, Patent
Holdup, the ITC, and the Public Interest, 98 CORNELL L. REv. I, 24 (2012) ("Patent holdup tends to
occur in complex, multicomponent products, particularly in information technology industries.").
62
See Christopher A. Cotropia, The Folly of Early Filing in Patent Law, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 65,
69-70 (2009) (noting that the U.S. patent system encourages early filing because it removes barriers to
filing by not forcing actual reduction to practice and penalizes those who file later).
63
Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, The Inducement Standard of Patentability, 120 YALE
L.J. 1590, 1661 (2011); Cotropia, The Folly ofEarly Filing, supra note 62, at 69; Sichelman, supra note
20, at 343.
64
See Cotropia, The Folly of Early Filing, supra note 62, at 70 ("The earlier patents are filed, the
more likely they go undeveloped."); Michael Risch, Reinventing Usefulness, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1195,
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invention is commercialized, it may be delayed while the inventor waits for
complementary technology, public adoption, and so on. The
implementation of the America Invents Act65 and its first-to-file provision
has made this problem more acute. 66 Ultimately, though, the reward of a
patent often compensates the best inventor rather than the best person or
entity to merely commercialize the invention.67 This is not a new
phenomenon; history is replete with famous and prolific inventors who
were better at creating than commercializing. Inventors such as Thomas
Edison, Elias Howe, and Charles Goodyear each licensed his own
technology to others for commercialization.68 Considering the lengthy
history of inventors who were unable or unsuccessful at commercializing
their own technology, it would seem that the relationship between a
licensing business model and commercialization would be well
understood. However, the truth is that there is still much debate on this
point.
C. Impact of the Patent Licensing Business Model on Commercialization
There are different views regarding the effect of the patent licensing
business model on commercialization. 69 Much of the academic
commentary is critical of the patent licensing business model, alleging that
it increases transaction costs (including litigation costs), as well as leads to
bad behavior, such as exploiting "submarine patents," "royalty stacking,"
and other high crimes and misdemeanors. 70 This Part will focus instead on
1212-13 (explaining how the timing of filing "can have significant effects on commercialization ... [as
sJome inventions will never be useful, while others are simply not useful at the time of invention.").
65
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29 § 3, 125 Stat. 284, 285 (2011)
(amending 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) to reflect a first-to-file system).
66
See Cotropia, The Folly of Early Filing, supra note 62, at 70 ("Filing early and often
exacerbates many of the patent system's most recognized problems.").
67
Sichelman, supra note 20, at 344.
68
See, e.g., Naomi R. Lamoreaux et al., Patent Alchemy: The Market for Technology in US
History, 87 Bus. HIST. REV., Spring 2013, at 3, 6 (discussing Edison's use of assignments in order to
"finance the early stages of his career"); Adam Mossoff, The Rise and Fall of the First American
Patent Thicket: The Sewing Machine War of the 1850s, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 165, 185 (201l)(discussing
Howe's use of advertisements in his legal battle against J.M. Singer & Co., "the last firm standing").
For a discussion of Goodyear, see CHARLES SLACK, NOBLE OBSESSION: CHARLES GoODYEAR,
THOMAS HANCOCK, AND THE RACE TO UNLOCK THE GREATEST INDUSTRIAL SECRET OF THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY 43 (2002) ("Goodyear's conception of rubber was always romantic rather than
commercial."). He was, however, good at finding investors for his inventions. Goodyear did not just
license his patents, but also litigated to enforce them. See Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What Thomas
Jefferson Thought About Patents? Reevaluating the Patent "Privilege" in Historical Context, 92
CORNELL L. REv. 953, 991-94 nn.178, 188, 192, & 194 (2007)(citing to several of Goodyear's cases).
69
For a helpful discussion of both sides of the patent troll conversation, see Sannu K. Shrestha,
Note, Trolls or Market-Makers? An Empirical Analysis of Nonpracticing Entities, 110 COLUM. L.REV.
114, 119-31 (2010).
70
See, e.g., Bessen & Meurer, supra note 1, at 387, 399-402 (discussing the costs of nonpracticing entity litigation to large and medium-sized firms, and the amount of money that is
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the positive aspects of the licensing business model. The primary positive
claim about the licensing business model is that, by exploiting efficiencies
in the division of labor, these companies facilitate commercialization
through match-making and market-making functions. As a result of
"granting property entitlements," patents have become a commodity in the
market. 71 Likewise, a legitimate market for patents exists because patents
can be assigned, bought, and sold. 72 This basic legal premise underscores
the billions of dollars exchanged between market actors in the innovation
economy in the creation and market distribution of innovative technology.
While many of these untold numbers of business deals are unnoticed or
unreported, the very large commercial transactions often make the news.
For example, in an April 2012 bilateral deal, Microsoft purchased over
nine hundred patents from AOL, which was followed by the subsequent
sale of a portion of these patents to Facebook. 73 If the parties are not both
big firms or are not well-established, repeat players in the innovation
economy, it can be difficult for patent buyers and sellers to find each
other. 74
Furthermore, if an individual inventor seeks to take advantage of the
division of labor, which makes a complex commercial economy function
so well, and thus monetize his patent via licensing with established firms
that are experts in manufacturing or retail sales, the individual inventor
may not possess a credible threat of litigation. The threat is often missing
due to lack of resources to commence and sustain an infringement lawsuit

transferred to small inventors); Chien, Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths, and Kings, supra note 28, at 1577,
1592 (discussing predatory lawsuits); Feldman & Ewing, supra note 20, at 20-21 ("Plagued by
boundless uncertainty, insufficient information, and high transaction costs, the true patent system looks
nothing like the idealized version."); Lemley & Melamed, supra note 13, at 2173 (asserting that
litigation follows when patent claims are not commensurate with actual inventions); Sichelman, supra
note 20, at 384 (discussing inventor-commercializer transaction costs).
71
See McDonough, supra note 13, at 206 (explaining that "the only mechanism by which a patent
owner may enforce his [property] entitlement is a civil lawsuit" and when "a credible threat of
litigation exists, a patent becomes a commodity''); Mossoff, Exclusion and Exclusive Use in Patent
Law, supra note 52, at 349-50 (explaining how the uniquely American legal definition of patent as
property was essential to securing the reward to inventive labor via monetizing patented innovation in
the marketplace).
72
See 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2012) (providing that, since patents are defined as "property," the owners
of patents "may in like manner grant and convey an exclusive right"); see also McDonough, supra note
13, at 207 (arguing that patents are commodities); Mossoff, Exclusion and Exclusive Use in Patent
Law, supra note 52, at 322 (noting that the Supreme Court agrees that "patents are property insofar as
patents secure a right to exclude").
73
Andrei Hagiu & David B. Yoffie, The New Patent Intermediaries: Platforms, Defensive
Aggregators, and Super-Aggregators, 27 J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 2013, at 45 .
74
Id.; see also Gregory Gorder, Innovation and the Invention Gap: The Need/or a New Invention
Economy, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 811, 822 (2014) ("As a market maker, an NPE can act as an
intermediary between the large number of small, distributed portfolios of invention . . . and the
manufacturing companies that need access to vast numbers of invention rights.").
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75

against larger corporations. In these cases, companies that have
specialized in the licensing business model can serve as key market
intermediaries. 76 For example, they connect inventors who are unable or
unwilling to commercialize their invention with willing and able
commercializers. 77 As intermediaries, these companies have more
knowledge and resources than individuals or small companies, who face
significant disadvantages when trying to license or enforce their own
patents. 78
Finally, as match-makers, patent licensing companies transfer
resources to inventors, providing funds for new development activity. 79 For
example, Intellectual Ventures claims it has provided $500 million to
individual inventors by obtaining rights to their inventions and then
licensing this patented innovation to manufacturers and retailers. 80 Acacia
75
See Ryan T. Holte, Trolls or Great Inventors: Case Studies ofPatent Assertion Entities, 59 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. (forthcoming 2014), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=2426444 ("Individuals face a significant disadvantage in high stakes patent litigation unless they
allow P AEs to enforce their patents."); McDonough, supra note 13, at 209-11 (arguing that individual
inventors often lack the financial resources to pose a threat to large firms).
76
See Gorder, supra note 74, at 122.
77
See Daniel F. Spulber, Intellectual Property and the Theory of the Firm, in PERSPECTIVES ON
COMMERCIALIZING INNOVATION 9, 31 (F. Scott Kieff & Troy A. Paredes eds. 2012) ("Specialized
intermediaries began to create a market for patented technologies in the late 19th and early 20th century
. . . . This important development 'facilitated the emergence of a group of highly specialized and
productive inventors by making it possible for them to transfer to others responsibility for developing
and commercializing their inventions."') (citation omitted); Daniel A. Crane, Intellectual Liability, 88
TEX. L. REV. 253, 286-87 (2009) ("Troll defenders counter that trolls are socially useful intermediaries
between small investors and commercialization. Small investors may not have the resources to engage
in detecting infringers, licensing negotiations, or patent infringement lawsuits against infringers. By
buying up patents from small inventors, trolls may 'spur innovation by investing in undercapitalized
projects and reducing transaction costs for small inventors who are routinely robbed by large
corporations."') (citation omitted); B. Zorina Khan, Trolls and Other Patent Inventions: Economic
History and the Patent Controversy in the Twenty-First Century, 21 GEO. MASON. L. REV. 825, 832-35
(2014) ("Specialized intermediaries are especially valuable in new or emerging markets and in
instances in which asymmetries of information and other transaction costs are significant."); Edward
Wyatt, Inventive, at Least in Court, N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2013), www.nytimes.com/2013/07/17/bus
iness/ftc-tums-a-lens-on-abusers-of-the-patent-system.htrnl ("Patent assertion companies say they
provide many benefits for the technology industry and others, including a secondary market for patents
that allows inventors to commercialize a product that they otherwise could not successfully market.").
78
See Schwartz & Kesan, supra note 1, at 428 (arguing that patent trolls take on the costs and
risks of litigation that are too much for individual inventors and small companies to bear); see- also
McDonough, supra note 13, at 211; Pe.nin, supra note 25, at 635.
79
See, e.g., McDonough, supra note 13, at 190 (arguing that patent trolls benefit society by
providing liquidity, market clearing, and increased efficiency to the patent markets); Schwartz &
Kesan, supra note I, at 428 ("Without the payment from an NPE, the inventors would receive no
compensation whatsoever for their invention.").
8
Fact Sheet, supra note 35.
Intellectual Ventures is often classified as a patent troll. See, e.g., Lemley & Melamed, supra note
13, at 2119 ("The harshest criticism is reserved for companies like Intellectual Ventures, sometimes
called a 'super-troll' or 'troll aggregator,' for gathering and asserting or licensing tens of thousands of
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Research Corporation, another well-established company specializing in
the licensing business model, provides inventors with fifty percent of the
total royalties collected from its negotiated licenses. 81
Beyond facilitating the reward for invention---one of the core functions
of the patent system-as well as match-making, patent licensing
companies also engage in the all-important function of market-making by
adding liquidity to patents and reducing information asymmetries between
buyers and sellers. 82 Patents, as a general matter, are not easily converted
into cash. The precise valuation of patented innovation can be extremely
hard to determine. 83 Companies specializing in the licensing business
model create a centralized market in which patents are bought when a
seller is ready and sold when a buyer is ready. In short, the licensing
business model creates a liquid market in a valuable commodity (a
property right in innovation). 84 As a result, the licensing business model
makes it possible to reduce information asymmetries among market actors
and thus facilitate better and more efficient pricing of inputs throughout the
entire production and distribution process. Patents, more so than other
goods, are very difficult to evaluate, if only because they often represent
property rights in innovative technology that has yet to be sold in the
marketplace. 85 History is replete with predictions of failure in the evolution
of new technologies from telephones to radios to computers, by individuals
who were, in fact, experts. 86
Furthermore, patent transactions today often occur in a litigationavoidance context, obscuring accurate valuation. 87 Patent licensing
companies, by virtue of their full-time status as intermediaries and as
repeat players in the market, are in a better position to evaluate patents. 88
patents."). In addition to purchasing or licensing invention rights from individual inventors, Intellectual
Ventures also has an active research facility. Fact Sheet, supra note 35.
81
See Nicole Shanahan, Comment, Deconstructing the Patent Bubble: An Exploration of Patent
Monetization Entities from Sewing Machine Combination to Rockstar Bid Co., 29 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER& HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 17 (2013) (discussing testimony sent to FTC from Acacia). Although
50% may seem low, the same assets may gamer no reward without Acacia's acting as an intermediary.
Id. at 18.
82
See, e.g., McDonough, supra note 13, at 190 ("Patent trolls provide liquidity, market clearing,
and increased efficiency to the patent markets-the same benefits securities dealers supply capital
markets.").
83
See id. at 213-14 (describing how patents are valuated).
84
85

Id.
See Hagiu & Yoffie, supra note 73, at 46-47 (discussing how a lack of comparators makes

valuing patents difficult).
86
See David Pogue, Use It Better: The Worst Tech Predictions of All Time, SCI. AM. (Jan. 18,
2012 ),
http: I/www .scientificamerican.com/article/pogue-all-time-worst-tech-predictions/ (quoting
several famous scientists whose predictions were later disproved).
87
Hagiu & Yoffie, supra note 73, at 48.
88
See id. at 62 (discussing the intermediary's role with regard to the illiquidity and inefficiency of
the patent market); see also McDonough, supra note 13, at 214-15 (discussing how patent dealers'
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Because of their repeated presence in the market, they gain specialization
and experience in assessing patent value that individual inventors and
small companies are generally unable to obtain. 89 This decreases
information asymmetries, enables more efficient transactions, and
increases liquidity in the market for innovation. As a result, there is more
invention and commercialization because of the incentives provided to
inventors and the increased visibility of technological advances. 90
III. FORMERLY MANUFACTURING ENTITIES-CASE STUDIES

In today's debate about the patent system, it is often forgotten that
there are reasons why legitimate companies would come into existence as a
market intermediary, or why an existing, reputable company, such as IBM,
would decide to better serve its shareholders by shifting its business model
to one of solely or primarily licensing. Yet, similar to claims about
"holdup," this is theorizing and lacks significant empirical verification
beyond superficial anecdotal reports. This Part takes a step toward
remedying this defect with respect to understanding the licensing business
model by detailing several case studies of formerly manufacturing
entities--companies that used to manufacture or sell patented innovation
but then shifted their business models to licensing.
This Part first explains why the case study methodology is the
appropriate vehicle to explore the effects of formerly manufacturing
entities on commercialization. It then discusses case study narratives
derived from researching the subject companies and interviewing, where
possible, representatives from each company. This Part concludes with
observations about what these formerly manufacturing entities have in
common, as well as provides further illustrations from similarly situated
companies that were not case study subjects.

A. Why Utilize the Case Study Methodology
Determining the effects of the licensing business model generally, and
any patent licensing company in particular, on commercialization is
challenging due to the sheer complexity of the question. These effects
necessarily play out differently over time and across industries. Further, it
is difficult to sort out determinative variables in the licensing business
model from the myriad confounding variables that impact the innovation

experience with "risk pooling and equalized pricing" enables them to "better set a market clearing price
for the patent").
89
McDonough, supra note 13, at 214-15.
90
Id. at 223.
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economy, such as the economy generally, adoptions of industry standards
or norms, and government regulation. 91
There are limitations of a case study as well. A case study tends
towards descriptive research and as such is not a rigorous scientific way to
test a hypothesis. 92 It is, however, a useful "jumping-off point for the study
of new areas." 93 A case study "steps back from the overwhelming web of
data to pick up the thread of a single 'case' .... [and] follow[s] the path of
that one subject to see where it leads and attempt[s] to interpret its
lessons."94 In social science literature, "case studies are the preferred
method when (a) 'how' or 'why' questions are being posed, (b) the
investigator has little control over events, and (c) the focus is on a
contemporary phenomenon within a real-life context."95
These factors suggest that, for an initial assessment of the licensing
business model, the case study methodology is the correct approach.
Measuring the effect of patent licensing generally on commercialization
would be a very useful question to study in depth; however, the amount of
information, not to mention aspects, to pursue, is beyond the scope of this
Article and is beyond the scope of research in this area more generally. For
instance, many licenses--or at least the specific terms of these
transactions-are not public information, and thus the quantifiable data
necessary for a rigorous empirical study is unavailable. 96
Rather than advance any sort of quantifiable, empirical claim, this
Article instead follows the path of a single "case"-a particular type of
company pursuing the licensing business model-and sees where it leads.
Here, it is the formerly manufacturing entity. The purpose is to examine
how and why formerly manufacturing entities chose the licensing model
and the effect this choice has had on commercialization of their patented
innovation. While not producing a statistically significant result derived
from a proper regression analysis, such case studies "offer a helpful reality
check" on current theoretical clainis97 and, in this case, demonstrate that
some of these claims may be wrong.

91

See Lea Shaver, Illuminating Innovation: From Patent Racing to Patent War, 69 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 1891, 1900 (2012) (using similar complexities to justify the case study methodology to
examine innovation).
92
David L. Faigman, To Have and Have Not: Assessing the Value of Social Science to the Law
as Science and Policy, 38 EMORY L.J. 1005, 1056 n.183 (1989).
93
JULIAN L. SIMON, BASIC RESEARCH METHODS IN SOCIAL SCIENCES: TuE ART OF EMPIRICAL
INVESTIGATION 52 (2d ed. 1978) ("Descriptive research, often in the form of case studies, is usually the
jumping-off point for the study of new areas in the social sciences.").
94
Shaver, supra note 91, at 1901-02.
95
ROBERT K. YIN, CASE STUDY RESEARCH: DESIGN AND METHODS 2 (4th ed. 2009).
96
Some scholars are finding innovative ways to address these information deficiencies. See, e.g.,
Galetovic et al., supra note 61, at 4 (using price decline as a proxy to assess holdup).
97
Shaver, supra note 91, at 1903.
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B. Case Study Narratives

For the case study, I examined four companies using the licensing
business model at different stages of their business lives. The first two
companies, Conversant and Soverain Software, have been widely and
publicly branded as "patent trolls." The third, Immersion Technologies, has
not been so labeled, but it could be given the similarities of its licensing
business model to Conversant and Soverain Software's licensing business
models. The last commercial entity, Rockstar, is not a typical formerly
manufacturing entity because it was created when a manufacturing
company (Nortel) went bankrupt and its patented innovation was
purchased by a licensing company, which was itself created and funded by
a consortium of manufacturing entities. These companies are also in the
news: Conversant and Rockstar were mentioned in Intellectual Asset
Management's "IP personalities of 2013."98 Conversant, Soverain
Software, and Rockstar are all mentioned by prominent scholars on "patent
trolls." 99 All four of the subjects provide interesting and wide-ranging
narratives about what it is to be a formerly manufacturing entity. The
subjects also demonstrate the heterogeneity within one subcategory of the
licensing business model.
1. Conversant Intellectual Property Management

Conversant IP Management, formerly known as MOSAID, 100 has been
criticized widely by academics as a "patent troll." 101 Given its commercial
evolution and its high profile, Conversant is probably an archetype of the
category of formerly manufacturing entities.
Conversant's predecessor, MOSAID, began as a semiconductor
technology company in 1975-a company that invented and manufactured
computer chips. 102 Among the products it made were improved dynamic
98

They Made the Big IP News in a Very Busy Year ... , 64 lNTELL. ASSET MGMT., Mar.-Apr.

2014,at4.
99

See Lemley & Melamed, supra note 13, at 2136 n.83 (discussing Conversant); id. at 2134 n.71
(discussing Soverain); id. at 2138 (discussing Rockstar Bidco).
100
MOSAID changed its name to Conversant Intellectual Property Management in September
2013 to "reflect [its] singular expertise in patent licensing and IP management," according to President
and CEO John Lindgren. Press Release, Conversant Intell. Prop. Mgmt., MOSAID Doubles in Sizeand Becomes Conversant (Sept. 19, 2013), available at http://www.conversantip.com/newsarticle/mosaid-doubles-in-size-and-becomes-conversant/. For the sake of clarity, this Article will
simply refer to the company as Conversant throughout.
101
See Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace, supra note 12, at 328 (stating that MOSAID is a
"company that has transitioned away from research and towards patent assertion" as its primary
business); Robin Feldman, Intellectual Property Wrongs, 18 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 250, 306 n.185
(2013) (describing MOSAID as a "known patent troll"); Lemley & Melamed, supra note 13, at 2137
(describing MOSAID as a "former practicing entity turned troll").
102
History, CONVERSANT lNTELL. PROP. MGMT., http://conversantip.com/aboutlhistory/ (last
visited Sept. 1, 2014) [hereinafter History].
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random access memory (DRAM) chips, as well as equipment for
debugging prototype chips. 103 Through the years, the company continued
to design and make memory chips, but it also sold chip designs to other
companies to fabricate on their own. 104 In the mid-l 990s, the company
recognized that its chip designs were being used without its consent and
thus it began a licensing program to help infringers become authorized
licensees. At this time, the company was still researching and developing
new technologies, 105 and thus its licenses covered only its own homegrown
patented innovation. It granted its first license for its patented DRAM
technology in 1999, and it continued to license only its own patented
DRAM technology from 1999 to 2007. 106 In 2007, the company
restructured to focus primarily on patent licensing, selling off its chip
design and memory test manufacturing units. 107 In 2007 and 2009,
MOSAID purchased patents covering similar technologies and added them
to the patent portfolio that it licenses to manufacturers and other
companies. 108
Since 2009, the company has expanded both its research and
development (R&D) and licensing activities. On the R&D front, the firm
has developed a new flash memory technology, which includes both
patents and products. 109 On the licensing front, the company has acquired
additional patents and currently holds a portfolio of over twelve thousand
patents. 110 Some of these patents cover technology developed by
Conversant's own R&D department, while others were obtained through
acquisitions or partnerships. 111 Conversant' s licensing program has proven
quite successful. The company claims it has "7 for 7" renewals, which
means that all seven memory patent licensees re-signed license renewals
for the same or higher rate upon or before expiration of the previous
license. 112

103

Id.

104

History, supra note 102; Semiconductor Licensing-Driving Value, MOSAID TECHS. 9 (Sept.
2013) [hereinafter Semiconductor Licensing], http://www.lesusacanada.org/docs/high-tech-sector/mos
aid-semiconductor-licensing_les_ shaer. pdf.
105
History, supra note 102.
106
Semiconductor Licensing, supra note 104.
107
Id. at 10.
108 Id.
109

History, supra note 102; see also Products, HLNAND (2014), hlnand.com/site/ID/products
(providing product briefs and data sheets on three chip types); Company, HLNAND (2014),
http://hlnand.com/site/ID/company (providing data that HLNAND is developed by Conversant).
110
Our Portfolio, CONVERSANT, http://conversantip.com/our-portfolio/ (last visited Aug. 31,
2014).
Ill Id.
112
Semiconductor Licensing-Driving Value, MOSAID TECHS. (Sept. 2013), http://www.
lesusacanada.org/docs/high-tech-sector/mosaid-semiconductor-licensing_les_sha er. pdf.
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Conversant is frequently criticized by academics because it has
amassed a large portfolio of patents covering wireless technology and
because it endeavors to negotiate licenses surrounding this technology. 113
Conversant, however, disagrees with its "patent troll" label. Conversant's
chief intellectual property officer, Scott Burt, distinguishes Conversant
from the specious behaviors of some bad actors in the patent system. He
claims that "[t]here are companies that are engaged in spurious lawsuits,
seeking settlements· that are less than the cost of litigation. But not us. We
are a patent licensing company." 114
In addition to providing value through its own R&D, Conversant acts
as a market intermediary by aiding the transfer of new technologies to
firms that are in the best position to develop these technologies into new
products and services. 115 For example, in late 2009, Conversant learned of
an Italian company that wanted to divest its international portfolio of more
than two-hundred optical networking patents and pending applications. 116
The Italian company was at the forefront of innovation in this
technological sector, but was now in financial distress. 117 Conversant
acquired title to this patent portfolio and it even participated in prosecuting
the remaining patent applications before the close of the deal. 118
Conversant added approximately fifty new patents to the portfolio, and
ultimately invested over one million dollars to strengthen the patent
portfolio. 119 A few years later, Conversant sold the patent portfolio it
acquired from the Italian company to Google Inc. 120 Google planned to
use this technology as it developed its high-speed Internet fiber network in

113

See, e.g., Jameson Berkow, MOSAID Acquires 2,000 Nokia Patents, FIN. POST (Sept. 1, 2011,
1:30 PM), http://business.financialpost.com/2011/09/01/mosaid-arms-for-wireless-patent-war-acquires2000-nokia-patents/?_lsa=b5b5-39d6&_ lsa=09c5-fa57 (discussing MOSAID's acquisition of patents
and Chief Executive John Lindgren's statements about the company's recent acquisitions); Matt Levy,
Dear IV: You're Not a "Better" Kind of Patent Troll, PATENT PROGRESS (Jan. 13, 2014),
www.patentprogress.org/2014/01/13/dear-i v-youre-better-kind-patent-troll/ (disparaging Conversant' s
business model because it is "based on forcing companies to pay for the right to continue doing what
they're already doing" and not "transferring technology to creat[ing] new products").
114
Jason Mick, FTC Will Probe "Patent Troll" Problem, But Won't Sue Anyone, DAILY TECH
(June 20, 2013, 10:03 AM), http://www.dailytech.com/FTC+Will+Probe+Patent+Troll+Problem
+But+Wont+Sue+Anyone/article31799 .htm.
115
Jon Dudas & David Kline, Patent Licensing: The Founding Fathers' Secret for Economic
Success, CONVERSANT 2 (Sept. 2013), http://www.conversantip.com/wp-content/uploads/PatentLicensing-The-Founding-Fathers-Secret-for-Economic-Success.pdf.
116
Abdul R. Zindani, A New Vision for Patent Prosecution as Asset Managers: Optimizing the
Value of Intellectual Property, CONVERSANT 4 (Sept. 2013), http://conversantip.com/wpcontent/up loads/A-New-Vision-for-Patent-Prosecution. pdf.
111 Id.
11s Id.
119 Id.
120 Id.
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121

Kansas and Missouri. The technology is currently in use in Kansas City,
as well as other areas around the country including Austin, Texas and
Provo, Utah. Its use is expanding, as Google notes it is in early discussions
with thirty-four cities in nine metro areas. 122
2. Soverain Software
Soverain Software represents another version of a formerly
manufacturing entity. The Soverain Software story begins with a company
called Open Market, Inc., an innovative tech firm that led the charge in
1993 into the e-commerce world on the then-new Intemet. 123 Like
Conversant, Soverain Software has been attacked for its licensing and
enforcement activities with respect to the patented innovation it acquired
from Open Market. 124
Open Market began in 1993 when the e-commerce industry was in its
beginning stages. 125 Previous uses of the Internet had largely been limited
to academic research and to military defense work. 126 Inventors at Open
Market recognized the potential for e-commerce, as well as the need for
new technology to open up the Internet for shopping. 127 The inventors
raced against many other companies, coding for more than twenty hours
per day and sleeping at the office. 128 The hard work paid off. Open Market
won the race to create software to support the emerging new e-commerce
industry. 129 With the technology developed, the company filed for patents
(including a copy of the source code) in October 1994. 130 In 1996, the
company went public. 131 From 1996 through 2000, Open Market's product,
Transact, was a leader in the e-commerce field, holding the majority of the
121

Jim O'Neill, Will Italian Cable Company's Patents Help Google Wire Its I-Gig Network in
Kansas City?, FIERCE CABLE (Mar. 6, 2012), www.fiercecable.com/story/will-italian-cable-companyspatents-help-google-wire-its-l-gig-network-kans/2012-03-06.
122
James O'Toole, People in Overland Park, Kansas, May Soon Have JOO Times Faster Internet
Than You, CNN MONEY (July 8, 2014, 2:16 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2014/07/08/technology
/innovation/google-fiber-overland-park/index.html?hpt=hp_t2; https://fiber.google.com/newcities/
123
Legacy, SOVERAIN, http://www.soverain.com/asp/about/about_legacy.asp (last visited August
31, 2014).
124
See Chloe Albanesius, Newegg Crushes Patent Troll in Online "Shopping Cart" Suit, PC
MAG. (Jan. 28, 2013, 4:24 PM), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2414778,00.asp
(characterizing Soverain as a patent troll and criticizing its lawsuits against Newegg and others for
infringing on its e-commerce technology, which was originally created by Open Market).
125
Legacy, supra note 123.
126
Timothy B. Lee, Everything You Need to Know About the Internet, Vox (Jun. 16, 2014, 4:55
PM), http://www.vox.com/cards/the-intemet/who-created-the-intemet.
127
See Interview with Katharine Wolanyk, President, Soverain Software (Dec. 6, 2013) (on file
with author).
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See id.
129 Id.
130
Noteworthy Patents, SOVERAIN, http://www.soverain.com/asp/intellectual/intellectual_patents
.asp (last visited Sept. 24, 2014 ).
131
Legacy, supra note 123.
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global market.
When the patents issued in 1998, Open Market was
hailed as a great success story. 133 At that time, however, software patents
were not aggressively enforced due to concerns that licensing efforts would
offend large tech companies. 134
As the 2000s approached, these larger tech companies entered the ecommerce technology field and then the dot.com bubble burst. 135 As a
result,· Open Market went through some restructuring and was purchased
by Divine, Inc. in 2001. 136 In 2003, Transact was acquired by Soverain
Software. 137 Soverain Software not only purchased the patents from the
original Open Market inventors and innovators, but many of these original
employees remain at Soverain. 138 Further, Soverain Software is possibly
mislabeled as a "formerly manufacturing entity," as it continues to offer
Open Market's Transact product for e-commerce business, as well as
support, training, and consulting for the product. 139 Soverain 's customers
range from mid-market to blue chip companies. 140
Recently, Soverain Software has found itself squarely in the sights of
the critics of "patent trolls." 141 In fact, Representative Bob Goodlatte, when
introducing H.R. 3309 (later called the Innovation Act of 2013 142),
criticized "abusive patent suits" that "claim ownership over basic ideas"

132

Id.

133

See Nick Wingfield, Three Patents Lift Open Market as Observers Guess Their Worth, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 4, 1998 (reporting that one analyst stated: "The most important thing is that it will allow
them to be acknowledged as a leader and be sought after for strategic relationships").
134
See Jon G. Auerbach, Open Markel Inc. Says It Will Receive Patents for Internet-Commerce
Software, WALL ST. J., Mar. 3, 1998, at B6 ("But an aggressive patent play also risks angering
competitors, many of which have even larger patent portfolios.").
135
See Editorial, The Dot-Com Bubble Bursts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2000, at WK8 (describing
the aftermath of the dot-com bubble bursting).
136
Legacy, supra note 123.
131 Id.
138
See, e.g., Gene Quinn, Who Is a Patent Troll?, IP WATCHDOG (Jan. 7, 2014, 4:42 PM),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/01 /07/who-is-a-patent-troll/id=4 7268/ ("[T]hey acquired patents to
facilitate their business plans and continue to be an operating company that services the products
covered by the software patents they now own and enforce."); Interview with Katharine Wolanyk,
supra note 127.
139
Products, SOVERAIN, http://www.soverain.com/asp/products/ (last visited Sept. I, 2014);
Services, SOVERAIN, http://www.soverain.com/asp/services/ (last visited Sept. I, 2014).
14
Customers, SOVERAIN, http://www.soverain.com/asp/about/about_customers.asp (last visited
Aug. 25, 2014).
141
E.g., Roy Schestowitz, Soverain Software Is a Patent Troll, TECHRIGHTS (Jan. 29, 2013, 5:17
PM), http://techrights.org/2013/0l/29/soverain-software/; see, e.g., Joe Mullin, How Newegg Crushed
the "Shopping Cart" Patent and Saved Online Retail, AR.s TECHNICA (Jan. 27, 2013, 4:00 PM),
http ://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/01/how-newegg-crushed-the-shopping-cart-patent-and-savedonline-retail/ (accusing Soverain of being a sham company in the business of filing patent lawsuits
against e-commerce companies).
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Innovation Act, H.R. 3309, I 13th Cong. (2013), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
pkg/BILLS-113hr3309ih/pd£'BILLS-113hr3309ih.pdf.
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such as "using a shopping cart on your website."
Although
Representative Goodlatte did not explicitly name Soverain Software in his
remarks, it was clear to everyone in the innovation industries and to the
stakeholders lobbying for the legislation exactly which company he was
referring to---Soverain Software was engaged at that time in a high-profile
patent infringement lawsuit with NewEgg about, among other things,
shopping cart technology. 144
Today, Soverain Software is fighting on multiple fronts-trying to
fend off the "patent troll" label that has been attached to it in the public
mind, continuing its dual-revenue streams of licensing and selling and
servicing the Transact product, and defending against repeated attacks on
its patents in the courts and in the administrative posr-grant review
programs at the Patent and Trademark Office. 145
3. Immersion Corporation
Unlike Conversant and Soverain Software, Immersion Corporation has
generally avoided being attacked as a "patent troll." However, given that it
has a patent licensing business model, 146 it may be only a matter of time
before this occurs. It shares many of the same characteristics of other
formerly manufacturing entities that have been so labeled. Specifically,
even before moving to a primarily licensing business model, Immersion
was described as "enthusiastic" in enforcing its patents on haptic feedback
technology. 147

143

Bob Goodlatte, Chairman, U.S. H.R. Judiciary Comm., Keynote Address at the American
Enterprise Institute: Innovators Versus Litigators: Chairman Bob Goodlatte on the Need for Patent
Reform (Oct. 24, 2013), available at www.aei.org/files/2013/10/25/-goodlatte-transcript_l653378
89129.pdf(intemal citation omitted).
144
Gary Shapiro, Beware the Patent Trolls: Innovators Need Protection from Legal Leeches,
WASH. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2013), www.washingtontimes.com/new/2013/apr/l 6/beware-the-patent-trolls/;
see Katharine Wolanyk, Published Letter to Chairman Goodlatte, SOVERAIN (Nov. 18, 2013),
www.soverain.com/pdfi'Letter_to_Chairman_Goodlatte. pdf (responding to statements about Soverain' s
business and patents made by U.S. House Judiciary Committee Chairman Bob Goodlatte).
145
See Interview with Katharine Wolanyk, supra note 127.
Soverain Software recently suffered a blow when the Supreme Court denied certiorari in its
appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which held multiple patents to
be invalid, despite surviving previous reexaminations at the United States Patent and Trademark Office.
Soverain Software LLC v. Newegg, 134 S. Ct. 910, 910 (2014).
146
See Immersion Corporation Reports Record Revenues in First Quarter 2013, BUSINESS WIRE
(May 2, 2013, 4:15 PM), www.businesswire.com/news/home/20130502006276/en/lmmersionCorporation-Reports-Record-Revenues-Quarter-2013#.U_ze17ywli0 (attributing Immersion's record
revenues in 2013 to the scalability of their licensing business model).
147
See Jon Fingas, Google Settles Patent Lawsuit from Immersion over Motorola Use of Haptic
Feedback, ENGADGET (Nov. 27, 2012), http://www.engadget.com/2012/l l/27/google-settles-patentlawsuit-from-irtunersion-over-motorola-haptics/ ("lmmersion is known for guarding its haptic feedback
patents with enthusiasm .... ").
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Immersion was founded in 1993 and is currently the leading innovator
in haptic technology. 148 Haptic technology provides tactile feedback, such
as the "rumble effect" in game controllers and "touch vibration" in
smartphone dial pads. 149 The technology has a number of other
applications, including being used in the automobile and medical
industries. 150 In 2002, Immersion sued Microsoft and Sony, alleging
infringement of the haptic technology in the Xbox and PlayStation game
controllers. 151 In 2003, Microsoft settled with Immersion, paying a $26
million licensing fee and receiving a stake in the company. 152 Sony did not
settle at this time, opting instead to take the dispute to court. Sony lost, and
was ordered to pay Immersion $82 million in damages. 153 Sony appealed
and lost again, and decided at that point to remove the haptic technology
from the PlayStation 3 controller. 154
In 2010, Immersion sold off a less-than-successful simulation
equipment business and adopted a pure licensing business model, holding
at that time more than eight hundred patents. 155 The company now owns
over twelve hundred issued or pending patents. 156 Even when it was
manufacturing products based on its patented technologies, Immersion was
not shy about enforcing its patents against infringers. 157 Such patent
infringement lawsuits may continue; only now, the company bringing the
148
Leading Innovator in Haptics Technology, IMMERSION, http://immersion.com/about/companyoverview/index.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2014).
149
Haptics Is Quite Literally The Science of Touch., IMMERSION, http://www.immersion.com/
haptics-technology/what-is-haptics/index.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2014).
150
What Products Use Haptics?, IMMERSION, http://www.immersion.com/hapticstechnology/haptics-in-use/index.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2014); see also Licensees, IMMERSION,
http://www.immersion.com/haptics-technology/licensees/index.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2014)
(listing the mobile device market and medical market as market segments in which Immersion licenses
its haptic technology, and providing a list of licensees, including LG Electronics, Microsoft, Sony, and
Volkswagen).
151
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Entertainment for Patent Infringement (Feb. 11, 2002), available at http://immr.client.shareholder.
com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=l l l 788.
152
Stephen Shankland, Microsoft Settles Suit with Immersion, CNET NEWS (Jul. 28, 2003, 6:34
PM), http://news.cnet.com/Microsoft-settles-suit-with-Immersion/2 l 00-1041 _3-5056455.html.
153
Jeremy Reimer, Sony Settles Legal Rumble with Immersion, ARs TECHNICA (Mar. 2, 2007,
9:06 AM), http://arstechnica.com/business/2007/03/8963/.
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VENTUREBEAT (Apr. 29, 2010, 7:00 AM), http://venturebeat.com/2010/04/29/immersion-sees-waveof-touch-feedback-smartphones-coming/.
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Leading Innovator in Haptics Technology, supra note 148.
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See, e.g., Press Release, Immersion Corp., Immersion Files Suit Against Microsoft and Sony
Computer Entertainment for Patent Infringement (Feb. 11, 2002), available at http://immr.client.
shareholder.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=J l I 788 (discussing Immersion's patent infringement
lawsuit against Microsoft Corporation, Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc., and Sony Computer
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lawsuit will likely be labeled with the pejorative moniker-"patent troll."
The licensing business model also means that Immersion now has
additional resources at its disposal to develop and refine its haptics
technology. Such ongoing R&D efforts, supported by its licensing revenue,
are important as the number of industries that use haptics technology in
their products continues to grow.
4. Rock.star Consortium
The last case study presents a unique perspective on the formerly
manufacturing entity tale, because it is an entirely different commercial
scenario from that represented by Conversant, Soverain Software, or
Immersion. This case study answers the all-important question: What
happens when a formerly manufacturing entity can no longer remain in
business under any business model? One option is to divest its assets to a
company practicing the licensing business model. Another option is to
divest its assets to another manufacturer.
In 2011, Nortel Networks was bankrupt and seeking a way to monetize
its remaining assets. 158 The bankruptcy court in charge of winding down
Nortel's commercial activities and distributing its assets to Nortel's
creditors hosted a public auction of its large patent portfolio. 159 Google
opened bidding for Nortel's portfolio at $900 million. 160 In response,
Microsoft, Apple, Research in Motion (now Blackberry), Sony, and other
leading mobile technology companies formed a new legal entity called
Rockstar Bidco, which began bidding for Nortel's patents. 161 A bidding
war between Google and Rockstar began. 162 By the end, Rockstar outbid
Google by $100 million and thus purchased approximately six thousand
patents covering communication technologies for the price of $4.5
billion. 163 Approximately two thousand of these patents were dispersed to
158
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Smartphone Patent War with Rand-Encumbered Patents, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 209, 213 (2012)
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2011, at BS.
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Networks by placing the winning bid at $4.5 billion."); Lemley & Melamed, supra note 13, at 2138
("Microsoft, Apple, and others formed a joint venture, called 'Rockstar Bidco,' both to acquire new
patent rights in smartphone technology and to establish a new entity that could assert those patents
against others.").
162
Robert McMillan, How Apple and Microsoft Armed 4,000 Patent Warheads, WIRED (May 21,
2012, 6:30 AM}, http://www.wired.com/wiredenterprise/2012/05/rockstar/.
163 Id.
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members of the consortium, such as Apple and Microsoft.
The
remaining four thousand or so patents were transferred to Rockstar
Consortium, a patent licensing company. 165 Recently, Rockstar Consortium
sued Google for patent infringement, and Google has counter-sued
Rockstar, alleging that the patents are invalid. 166
The difference between a bankrupt company's assets being transferred
to a patent licensing company and the same assets being transferred to a
consortium like Rockstar, comprised of manufacturing companies, is that
there is more to the story than the patent infringement lawsuit. One article
asserts that Rockstar "was pretty unapologetic about embracing the 'patent
troll' business model," but the article also states that twenty-five of
Rockstar's thirty-two employees were previously employed by Nortel. 167
Additionally, some critics of the patent licensing business model are a bit
tepid in their reaction to Rocks tar's patent infringement lawsuit against
Google-after all, the companies behind Rockstar are manufacturers.
Moreover, some of the companies, like Apple, are directly responsible for
the R&D that created the sn;iartphone revolution. 168 These same companies
have also been critical of patent licensing companies that have sued them,
even employing the same "patent troll" rhetoric first coined by Intel
attorney Peter Detkin more than a decade ago. 169 But their creation of
Rockstar, and their ongoing sales of patents to other patent licensing
companies, 170 makes clear that there are often no clear-cut heroes or
villains in these disputes.
164 Id.

Id.
Joe Mullin, Google Files Counter-Suit against Rockstar, Seeking to Avoid East Texas, ARs
TECHNICA (Dec. 26, 2013, 9: 15 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/12/google-files-countersuit-against-rockstar-seeking-to-avoid-east-texas/. Although this is a standard maneuver in defending a
patent infringement lawsuit, it is interesting that Google was willing to pay $900 million for invalid
patents.
167
Joe Mullin, Patent Wa1< Goes Nuclear: Microsoft, Apple-Owned "Rockstar" Sues Google, ARs
TECHNICA (Oct. 31, 2013, 11: 10 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/l O/patent-war-goesnuclear-microsoft-apple-owned-rockstar-sues-google/.
168
See, e.g., Bryan Chaffin, Apple and Microsoft-Owned Rockstar Muddies 'Patent Troll' Waters
with Google Suit, Turn MAC OBSERVER (Nov. 1, 2013, 9:54 PM), http://www.macobserver.com/tmo/
article/apple-and-microsoft-owned-rockstar-muddies-patent-troll-waters-with-google (explaining that
although Rockstar is a non-practicing entity, it is owned by practicing entities, such as Apple, whose
innovations with iOS provided the foundation for Android's success).
169
See, e.g., Glenn G. Lammi, No Name Calling In MY Court: Judge Bans Use Of Term "Patent
Troll" In Jury Trial, FORBES (June 30, 2014, 10:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/wlf/2014/06/30/
no-name-calling-in-my-court-judge-bans-use-of-term-patent-troll-in-jury-trial/ (reporting how Judge
Koh prohibited Apple from referring to the plaintiff as a "patent troll" in the patent infringement trial).
170
See, e.g., Tam Habert, The Troubled Life of Patent No. 6,456,841: Tracing the Tortured Legal
Trail of a Simple Smartphone Patent, IEEE SPECTRUM (April 29, 2013, 6:00 PM),
http://spectrum.ieee.org/at-work/innovation/the-troub led-life-of-patent-no-6456841 (describing a patent
sold by Apple to a licensing company, which then sued numerous high-tech companies-not including
Apple-for patent infringement).
16s
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Today, the companies behind Rockstar have access to a potential
revenue stream as well as cross-licensing or defensive capabilities, both of
which can result in increased innovation and commercialization by these
companies. 171 Further, having access to this large patent portfolio covering
most aspects of telecommunications technology allows these firms to
develop products without the overhead of a high level of clearance, giving
them freedom and resources to enter new areas of development and new
markets. 172
C. Common Characteristics ofFormerly Manufacturing Entities
These case studies explore one class of patent licensing entitycompanies that used to manufacture or sell products or services in the
marketplace but then shifted to a licensing business model. Although there
are only four subjects in the case study, the class of formerly
manufacturing entities is likely larger than many may initially believe.
Thus, the four subject companies described above are not outliers or
unusual cases. One study found that only 21.5% of patents asserted by
patent licensing entities were issued to patent licensing companies at the
time the patents were first obtained. The remaining 78.5% of patent owners
in the study either had, or attempted, to first produce or sell something with
the technology. 173 In addition to the manufacturing companies who sell
patents to licensing entities, such as Apple, 174 this 78.5% includes the class
of formerly manufacturing entities.
Further, many of the most notable patent licensing entities actually fall
into the category of formerly manufacturing entities. This includes
Conversant, as described above, and others not in these case studies, such
as the (in)famous NTP, lnc. 175 NTP was probably the first company widely
171
See, e.g., Florian Mueller, Cisco Might Have Had a Greater Benefit from Joining Rockstar
than Cross-licensing with Google, Foss PATENTS (Feb. 5, 2014), http://www.fosspatents.com/2014/02/

cisco-might-have-had-greater-benefit.html (analyzing the benefits available to Rockstar consortium
members).
m Id.
173
Michael Risch, Patent Troll Myths, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 457, 486 (2012). Risch also
studied whether patent trolls obtained patents during "fire sales" by failing companies; his data
indicated they did not; although companies may license their patents under distress, even if they do not
ultimately fail. Id. at 489-90.
174
See Habert, supra note 170 and accompanying text (discussing Apple's patent sales).
175
See Decrease Your Exposure to Patent Trolls, FILAMENT, http://www.filament.com.au/ipintelligence/patent-troll.aspx (last visited Sept. 23, 2014) (describing how NTP, Inc. sued Research in
Motion for Blackberry email patents, yet Research in Motion actually made the Blackberry, suggesting
that NTP, Inc. is a patent troll). Other notable patent licensing entities that began as manufacturing
entities, in addition to those in the case studies, include Tessera, Wi-LAN, and Rambus, all of which
have appeared on Patent Freedom's largest patent licensing company list. See Largest Patent Holdings,
PATENT FREEDOM (July 14, 2014), https://www.patentfreedom.com/about-npes/holdings/. The category
of formerly manufacturing entity also includes Opti, Inc. See Opti Inc. Company Description,
BUSINESS WEEK (Aug. 21, 2014, 8:10 PM), http://investing.businessweek.com/research
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attacked as a "patent troll" when it sued Research in Motion in 2001 for
infringing NTP's patents covering wireless telecommunications
technology. 176 Many people, however, do not realize that NTP became a
patent licensing entity only after repeatedly failing to succeed at
manufacturing and selling its patented technology. 177 Other patent
licensing entities that fall within the formerly manufacturing entity
category include firms that are still pr~cticing-like Soverain Software, as
described above-but have devoted a significant portion of their business
model to licensing. 178 For example, InterDigital was named one of "Tech's
8 Most Fearsome Patent Trolls" in 2012 by Business lnsider, 179 but
InterDigital was publicly lauded the following year as a company likely to
succeed in the white-space network area based on the dynamic spectrum
management systems its own researchers had invented. 180 As noted earlier,
even Intellectual Ventures employs hundreds of inventors and researchers
in creating its own innovative technology. 181
At some point, each of these companies recognized the commercial
reality that continuing to operate solely as a manufacturing business would
not be viable because they would fail and go bankrupt. 182 Some formerly
manufacturing entities were in the manufacturing business for many years,
if not decades, before adopting a licensing business model, such as IBM. 183
Others, such as NTP, attempted to enter the market as a manufacturer,
retailer, or both, but were met with failure or some other impediment to
participating in this particular business model. Reasons why a company
may have changed its business model include, among many others: foreign
competition, disaggregation of the supply chain, changes in technological

/stocks/snapshot/snapshot_article.asp?ticker=OPTI (describing Opti Inc. 's history as a former
manufacturing entity).
176
NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 392 F.3d 1336, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2004), opinion
withdrawn and superseded on reh'g in part, 418 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
177
Barrie McKenna et al., Patently Absurd: The Inside Story of RIM's Wireless War, GLOBE &
MAIL, Jan. 28, 2006, at B4 (showing that NTP's founder, Thomas Campana, Jr., made numerous
unsuccessful attempts to commercialize the invention himself before changing to a patent licensing
business model).
178
See supra Part III.B.2 (discussing Soverain's business model).
179
Erin Fuchs, Tech 's 8 Most Fearsome 'Patent Trolls', Bus. INSIDER (Nov. 25, 2012, 2:01 PM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/biggest-patent-holding-companies-2012-11?op=1.
180
See Kate Voss, 'White Space' Networks are Coming-Who Will Win, Who Will Lose?,
VENTUREBEAT (Oct. 24, 2013, 11:00 AM), http://venturebeat.com/2013/10/24/white-space-networksare-coming-who -will-win-who-will-lose/ (praising InterDigital's work developing "dynamic spectrum
management systems").
181
See Fact Sheet, supra note 35.
182
See, e.g., Kirkpatrick, supra note 14 (reporting how Lou Gerstner, when he became CEO at
IBM in 1993, ''took a dispirited, directionless, money-losing collection of businesses and utterly
transformed it" by making it "service-driven").
183
See Hosteny, supra note 33.
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standards or preferences, and extraordinary amounts of unchecked
infringement by others in the market.
Based on the case studies presented above, there are at least three
common characteristics of formerly manufacturing entities (and other
similarly situated patent licensing entities). First, each of these companies
had previously created and then manufactured or sold technological
products and services in the marketplace. In fact, many formerly
manufacturing entities still do, except that it is no longer their primary
source of revenue. Second, since each company was once a manufacturer
or retailer, it is a repeat player in the marketplace and thus does not engage
in the type of deceptive practices rightly complained about by some bad
actors in the patent system. 184 Third, each of these companies continues in
some way to develop new technology, to support previously developed
technology, or to do both. In sum, these patent licensing companies are still
active participants in the innovation industries in which they live and
thrive. They reflect the efficiencies achieved in all markets through the
division of labor, and thus their licensing revenue creates added value for
additional invention, innovation, and customer support.
In conclusion, through their earlier manufacturing or retail business
models, companies in the formerly manufacturing entity category gained
valuable knowledge about the nature, value, and commercialization of
patented innovation. They are repeat players in the innovation economy,
not fly-by-night operators who own only one or two possibly suspect
patents, and thus they follow the social and commercial norms that are
internalized by legitimate commercial firms. These characteristics suggest
that formerly manufacturing entities uniquely have positive effects on core
patent policies: incentivizing invention and commercialization-a very
important insight that is buried underneath the unclear and inflammatory
"patent troll" rhetoric. This is even more important when we remember
that formerly manufacturing entities make up a substantial number, if not
the overwhelming majority, of patent licensing entities today.
IV. IMPLICATIONS AND LESSONS FOR PATENT POLICY
The characteristics of formerly manufacturing entities gleaned from the
case studies help to explain some of the effects of this particular patent
licensing entity on commercialization, and perhaps the impact of the
licensing business model more broadly. Although one must be careful not
184

See, e.g., Ashby Jones, Corporate News: New York Cracks Down on Patent Trolls, WALL ST.
J., Jan. 14, 2014, at 83 (reporting how a patent troll used deceptive tactics, such as sending "more than
1,000 letters" accusing New York businesses of i~fringing on its patents, sending "demand letters from
100 different subsidiary companies ... [and requiring] its targets to sigo nondisclosure agreements
before it would tell them basic information about the patents at issue. The troll also habitually included
false claims within the letters").
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to draw conclusions that are too strong from case studies, it does not mean
that they are meaningless. To the contrary, they are helpful starting points
for identifying important aspects of both patented innovation and the
innovation economy that may have been neglected or ignored in recent
scholarship. This Part identifies these issues and highlights some initial
insights, such as the meaning of commercialization within patent policy
and how formerly manufacturing entities may have a positive role in
commercializing new innovation. This poses challenges to assumptions
made about these companies under the unclear "patent troll" rhetoric
which, at a minimum, fails to properly distinguish the licensing business
model from the bad actors brin$ing nuisance lawsuits.
A. Redefining "Commercialization"

The first implication of these case studies is that many patent scholars
use a far too narrow or crabbed definition of "commercialization." The
term "commercialization" might seem simple: it is the act of bringing new
products or services to market. Yet, as this term has been used in the patent
policy debates in recent years, it has been employed in a far more
restrictive sense. To the critics of the patent licensing business model,
individuals or companies that manufacture and sell their own products or
services are deemed to be the only proper "commercializers" of patented
innovation; the market intermediaries that are a universal feature in every
aspect of a flourishing commercial economy are instead vilified as
somehow preventing or inhibiting commercialization.
The case studies presented in this Article challenge this unchecked and
incorrect assumption among scholars and commentators, which has been
driving the current patent policy debates. The property rights represented
in a patent, like all property rights, are meant to facilitate private ordering
in the use and disposition of the legally protected asset, which necessarily
includes the choice of business model. 185 Some business models may
include manufacturing or selling the patented technology, but other equally
legitimate and economically important business models include licensing
rights to patented technology or even selling outright the patents

185
See Spulber, supra note 77,.at 10 ("IP rights influence entrepreneurial activity because they
affect the innovators choice between entrepreneurship and technology transfer in the market for
ideas"); see also Adam Mossoff, A Simple Conveyance Rule for Complex Innovation, 44 TULSA L.
REV. 707, 714-15 (2009) ("On the basis of this conceptual linkage between property in land and in
inventions, nineteenth-century American courts developed the same default rule for patent conveyances
as had been employed for real property.... Patentees were able to impose a whole litany of restrictions
on the use of the property interest they conveyed to a licensee. For instance, a patentee could restrict a
licensee in terms of the total quantity of patented products manufactured or sold, the manner in which
the patented product may be used, the territorial scope in which the patented product may be used or
sold, and even the price that the licensee could charge in the marketplace.").
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186

themselves. As has been long recognized by economists, the licensing
business model allows for the advantages of specialization and upstream or
downstream economies of scale, leading to many economic efficiencies. 187
Despite the recent concerns about the patent licensing business model, this
business model has existed for a very long time and has proven quite
successful. 188
History alone is not sufficient to justify, as a policy matter, the
licensing business model. However, the validity of the licensing business
model is further supported by the underlying policies in the American
patent system. The four incentive-based policy justifications for the patent
system include: the incentive to invent, the incentive to disclose, the
incentive to design around, and the incentive to commercialize. 189 The
licensing business model is justified by all four of these fundamental patent
policies.
First, consider the incentive to invent or to generate a novel idea. The
patent grant allows the inventor to obtain monopoly pricing as a reward;
through this, the inventor may recoup development costs for the new
technology as well as obtain resources for further new invention. 190 But, an
invention in a garage or R&D lab is not the same thing as the technological
product or service purchased by consumers in the marketplace and used
every day by laypeople. This is true even for sophisticated market actors.
For example, it took Apple several years to go from the original conception
186
See B. ZORINA KHAN, THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF INvENTlON: PATENTS AND COPYRIGHTS IN
AMERICAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, 1790-1920 9-10 (Cambridge University Press 2005) ("The
analysis [in this book] emphasizes the role that patents and copyrights played in the securitization of
ideas through the creation of tradeable assets: intellectual property rights facilitated market exchange, a
process that assigned value, helped to mobilize capital, and improved the allocation of resources ....
Extensive markets in patent rights allowed inventors to extract returns from their activities through
licensing and assigning or selling their rights.").
187
See, e.g., B. Zorina Khan, Trolls and Other Patent Inventions, supra note 77, at 835
(explaining how "specialization and the division of labor are endemic to efficient markets," and that
securitization helped increase the development of technology).
188
See Michael Risch, Licensing Acquired Patents, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 979, 979 (2014)
("Patents have always been licensed . . . and acquired."); see also KHAN, DEMOCRATIZATION OF
INvENTION, supra note 186, at 8-10 (explaining the history of patents in the United States); Lamoreaux
et al., supra note 68, at 4-5, 82 ("[T]here is actually nothing new about the practice of extracting
economic value from patents by selling off or licensing the rights."). Moreover, as a historical matter,
patentees who assigned their rights were among the most productive inventors. See Khan, Trolls and
Other Patent Inventions, supra note 77, at 835 (''Nonpracticing entities and specialists in the
enforcement of patent rights were the norm during the nineteenth century ....").
189
See, e.g., F. Scott Kieff, Coordination, Property & Intellectual Property: An Unconventional
Approach to Anticompetitive Effects and Downstream Access, 56 EMORY L.J. 327, 399 n.251 (2006)
(listing the different incentive based theories for patents, including "incentive to invent, the incentive to
disclose, the incentive to commercialize, and the incentive to design around") (internal quotations
omitted).
190
See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text (describing the various incentives the patent
system gives to encourage commercialization).
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191

of the smartphone to the first sale to consumers. While the creation of
new ideas is certainly something to promote, to the extent that patents
actually create new ideas does not bring a new product to market. 192 And,
in fact, many inventors lack the resources, capability, or interest necessary
to commercialize. 193
Second, consider the incentive to disclose. Simply devising a new
technology, filing a patent application, and receiving a patent does not by
itself result in a commercial product or service sold in the marketplace.
Rather, new information is disclosed and disseminated among researchers
and market actors. 194 But, just as with the too narrow sense of
"commercialization" used by critics of the patent licensing business
model, 195 disclosure is not achieved merely through the patent document
itself. Commercialization provides important disclosure of the patented
technology, and arguably improves the quality of the disclosure as well.
This is intuitively recognized by anyone who has experienced the
difference between reading a treatise and practicing the topic discussed in
the treatise, such as between reading about sailing and actually sailing a
boat. In the innovation economy, a patented technology sold in the
marketplace as an actual product or service makes it possible for third
parties to have a better understanding of the scope of the patent and the
inventor's contribution to the field of technology. 196 In fact, it is common
today to hear complaints about the lack of proper disclosure in patents, 197
which ultimately led to the Supreme Court hearing its first case in fifty
191
See Shara Tibken, Apple Engineer: We Wanted to Make a Phone for 'Normal People', CNET
(Apr. 4, 2014, 12:21 PM), http://www.cnet.com/news/apple-engineer-we-wanted-to-make-a-phone-fornormal-people/ (describing how Apple took over three years to make a smart phone that was userfriendly for the average person).
192
See Sichelman, supra note 20, at 343 ("About half, probably more, of all patented inventions
in the United States are never commercial exploited.").
193 Id.
194
See, e.g., John F. Duffy, Reviving the Paper Patent Doctrine, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1359, 1363
(2013) (explaining how patents incentivize "the disclosure and teaching of the invention to a
workforce").
195
See supra notes 55--61 and accompanying text (discussing a broader version of the patent
system and commercialization).
196
See Duffy, Reviving the Paper Patent Doctrine, supra note 194, at 1392 ("That intuitive truth
about good teaching also directly links with policy concerns that the courts have repeatedly identified
as being at the heart of the patent system, which is to provide inventors with exclusive rights that are
commensurate with their contributions to public knowledge-that are commensurate with their
teachings.").
197
See, e.g., Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Do Patents Disclose Usefal Information?, 25 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 545, 547 (2012) (noting that legal scholars have called for "invigorated disclosure"); Sean B.
Seymore, The Teaching Function of Patents, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 627 (2010) (proposing a
regime of heightened disclosure to the PTO which will transform the "patent into a readable teaching
document[,] ... bridge the disconnect between patent law and the norms of science[,] ... [and] produce
more technically robust patents, which will make it easier for subsequent inventors to improve upon
existing patented technology").

470

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:435

years on the written description and claim definiteness requirement. 198 In
this respect, licensing patented innovation to manufacturers facilitates
commercialization and, ultimately, the disclosure of the technology in a
real-world product or service. 199
Third, consider the incentive to commercialize. The twenty-year term
of the patent secures innovators against free-riding second-movers, as
discussed above. 200 But licensing of a patent by an inventor to someone
who can manufacture the product equally facilitates getting a product to
market. It simply is brought to market by someone other than the inventor
and often by someone who is more knowledgeable and better situated to do
so. 201 This leads to lower prices and more accessible technology for
everyone, producing the exact "Progress of Science and useful Arts" that
the Constitution expounds and the patent system is intended to create. 202
More importantly, the inventor-through licensing fees or profits from
selling the patent--obtains additional resources tor future invention,
reinforcing the incentive to invent.
All of this is easiest to see in the matchmaking function of patent
licensing entities, which connect inventors and their technologies with the
well-financed and sophisticated companies that are best equipped to
commercialize this technology. If licensed ex ante, or before a
commercialized product enters the market, the relationship between the
inventor and the manufacturing company results in a new idea being
transformed into a product or service sold in the marketplace. The only
difference between this and an inventor directly commercializing is that the
entity doing the commercial work switches part of the way through the
process, achieving the efficiencies of the division of labor and market
specialization.
Admittedly, the argument is not as straightforward if the patent
licensing company seeks licenses to a patented technology ex post, or after
198
See Nautilus Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2124 (2014) ("[A] patent is
invalid for indefiniteness if its claims, read in light of the specification delineating the patent, and the
prosecution history, fail to inform, with reasonable certainty, those skilled in the art about the scope of
the invention.").
199
Better disclosure also makes it more possible for competitors in the marketplace to design
around the patented technology in creating competing products and services. Jeanne Fromer, Patent
Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 548 (2009) ("[D]isclosure can stimulate others to design around the
invention .... ").
200
See supra notes 43-54, and accompanying text (discussing how the patent system encourages
commercialization by providing a "first mover" with its own advantages).
201
See, e.g., Adam Mossoff, The History of Patent Licensing and Secondary Markets in Patents:
An Antidote to False Rhetoric, CPIP BLOG (Dec. 9, 2013), http://cpip.gmu.edu/2013/12/09/the-historyof-patent-licensing-and-secondary-markets-in-patents-an-antidote-to-false-rhetoric/ (quoting Henry
Ford's famous quip that Thomas Edison was "the world's greatest inventor and the world's worst
businessman").
202
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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a product is already being manufactured and sold in the marketplace. 203
How can this be considered commercialization? The answer is found by
recognizing that the incentive to invent and the incentive to commercialize
necessarily work together to further the goals of the patent system. 204 The
inventor whose patented technology was brought to market by someone
else---even without the inventor's permission-still deserves the reward
for being the first to invent a new innovative technology and obtain
resources for further invention and innovation. Additionally, the licensing
business model may lead to further innovation and potential
commercialization, as licensees should pay greater attention to patents at
earlier stages. This would allow new products to be brought to market
earlier, make it possible for faster design-around work, and foster greater
competition, which lowers prices and spurs further innovation. 205
In sum, the licensing business model, as best exemplified by formerly
manufacturing entities, makes clear that "commercialization" is not
synonymous with manufacturing. Instead, it refers generally to the myriad
of private-ordering mechanisms that result in bringing new products to the
market. Thus, any activity that results in the transformation of a new idea
to a marketed product-be it manufacturing, selling, using, or licensingis commercialization. When viewed properly in this way, licensing thus
conforms to the core justifications of the patent system.
B. Formerly Manufacturing Entities and Commercialization

Formerly manufacturing entities complicate the stories regarding the
patent licensing business model. Rather than interfere with
commercialization efforts of other companies, this type of patent licensing
entity provides unique and valuable contributions to commercialization
that have yet to be considered in the current patent policy debates. This
Part will discuss how formerly manufacturing entities participate in
commercialization and, more importantly, how they positively affect
commercialization in ways that reflect core patent policy. This Part will
conclude by offering some recommendations for going forward in both
research of patent licensing and its assessment within th~ patent system.

203

See Risch, Licensing Acquired Patents, supra note 188, at 981 (stating that "[e]x post,
licensing acquired patents looks like a complete waste of social resources," and then refuting this point
in his article).
204
See id. ("[P]atents do not live solely in an ex post world. They simultaneously live in an ex
ante world, one where research, development, and licensing opportunities begin even before the patent
is acquired.").
205
See id. at 996.
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1. Effects on Commercialization
Under the proper definition of "commercialization," formerly
manufacturing entities commercialize patented innovation. Originally, the
formerly manufacturing entity was engaged in activities that turned new
ideas directly into marketed products, such as manufacturing and selling
products. When the formerly manufacturing entity shifted from a
manufacturing business model to a licensing business model, its primary
concern remained the production of actual products or services. The only
difference is that the formerly manufacturing entity is now a market
intermediary and thus serves a different market function in furthering the
commercialization process. A manufacturing business model and a
licensing business model both produce the same result-a marketed
product output.
In each of the case studies discussed above, the focus of the company
is squarely on bringing new products to market. Thus, these formerly
manufacturing entities are commercializing and achieving the goals of the
patent system. For example, the Italian company's optics patents and
patent applications that Conversant prosecuted and later sold to Google are
now being used to support Google's nascent efforts to supply high speed
fiber networks in Kansas City, Missouri, and Kansas City, Kansas. 206
Soverain's acquisition of Open Market and Transact has allowed the
product, relied on by many corporations, to remain on the market and be
fully serviced by the software company. 207 Immersion's change in business
model from manufacturer to product developer and licensor has permitted
its haptic technology to expand into many different market segments
through its use of a myriad of licensees.208 Finally, the licensing model of
Rockstar may allow the companies in the consortium to consider new
products and new markets without the worry of excessive clearance

206
See John Letzing, Italian Cable Co's Patents Make Their Way to Google, Dow JONES
FACTIVA (Mar. 5, 2012), http:/lwww.advfu.com/nyse/StockNews.asp?stocknews=BKS&article=
51491468 (reporting Google's acquisition of two hundred optical networking patents from MOSAID in
its effort to supply fiber networks for fast Internet connections).
207
See Legacy, supra note 123 ("Soverain acquired the Transact software business and its related
intellectual property from Divine in 2003, and [is] dedicated to developing and supporting that
technology today.").
208
See List of Licensees of TouchSense Haptics Technology, IMMERSION CORP., http:/lwww.
immersion.com/haptics-technology/licensees (last visited Sept. 29, 2014) (explaining that immersion
licenses its haptic technology ''to a wide range of partners, from device manufacturers to system
integrators and semiconductor partners," including, among others, LG Electronics, Logitech, Microsoft,
Nokia, Samsung, and Sony); cf Press Release, Conversant Intell. Prop. Mgmt., MOSAID Doubles in
Size-and Becomes Conversant (Sept. 19, 2013), available at http://www.conversantip.com/newsarticle/mosaid-doubles-in-size-and-becomes-conversant/ (repoting that MOSAID changed its name to
Conversant to "reflect [its] singular expertise in patent licensing and IP management").
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costs. These are just a few examples of the traditional commercialization
justification for a business model in the innovation economy.
Perhaps even more important are the unique effects that formerly
manufacturing entities have on commercialization. Patent licensing entities
of all sorts that are grouped together in the pejorative "patent troll" label
are accused of hindering the commercialization of new technology. There
are usually two arguments for this claim, and formerly manufacturing
entities belie these arguments in important ways.
First, patent licensing entities are said to engage in abusive litigation
practices because of the lack of deterrence from fear of a reciprocal
lawsuit. 210 What is rarely acknowledged is that patent licensing entities
generally facilitate commercialization by acting as match-makers and
market-makers. 211 Furthermore, formerly manufacturing entities provide
additional benefits. For example, the expertise of its prior business model
gives it the ability to better evaluate patents and the internalized social and
commercial norms from the industry in which it operates.
This, differentiates formerly manufacturing entities starkly from the
bad actors engaged in deceptive and nuisance-like behaviors who lack the
larger patent portfolios and existing market relationships that would
otherwise constrain them. For this reason, formerly manufacturing entities,
as represented by the fact that they are many of the owners of patents that
have been sold by the original grantee, are subject to various sources of
deterrence from bad behavior. When the business model of a firm shifts,
some of its business culture may remain. In fact, as illustrated in the case
studies, often employees that were present under the manufacturing
business model remain after the shift to a licensing business model. Thus,
the formerly manufacturing entity often behaves differently than other
patent licensing entities that do not have the same cultural norms ordinarily
cultivated from historical work in the relevant industry.
209
See Mueller, Cisco Might Have Had a Greater Benefit, supra note 171 ("By joining the
Rockstar Consortium, Cisco ... would benefit from licensing income generated from third parties.").
210
See Lemley & Melamed, supra note 13, at 2126 (discussing "bottom feeder" patent trolls who
are interested in "quick, low-value settlements" and are "not particularly interested in the quality of
their patents"); Gerard N. Magliocca, Blackberries and Barnyards: Patent Trolls and the Perils of
Innovation, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1809, 1829-30 (2007) ("[A] troll need not hold the rights to a
particularly important or valuable patent to get a hefty settlement .... [A]ssessing the probability of
success for an infringement suit is terribly challenging [for a defendant] .... "); Robert P. Merges, The
Trouble with Trolls: Innovation, Rent-seeking, and Patent Law Reform, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1583,
1603 (2009) ("[T]he history of patent law shows that these doctrines do not always do an adequate job
of preventing rent-seeking. At certain times, and for various reasons, the patent system is overwhelmed
with rent-seeking activities .... [T]he current wave of patent trolls shows that we may very well be
undergoing another of these episodes right now.").
211
See McDonough, supra note 13, at 214-15 ("Just as dealers on the NASDAQ match investors
with companies seeking owners and vice versa, patent dealers match patent owners with companies
seeking to commercialize a patent.").
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As these formerly manufacturing .entities branch out and begin to
acquire other parties' patents to add to their portfolio, there is no reason to
assume the company's culture would necessarily change. As an example of
the business ethos, these firms are likely to "employ a rigorous due
diligence process to ensure that the patents they license are of good quality
and highly likely to be upheld as valid," and "generally will resort to
litigation to enforce its valid patents only after protracted good-faith
negotiations" have failed. 212 Exemplifying this point, Conversant has
publicly announced a set of "Patent Licensing Principles" that details its
deep commitment to ethical business behavior. 213 Conversant has c;illed on
other patent licensing entities to join its Patent Licensing Principles, as a
way to self-regulate and self-police the important sub-industry of market
intermediaries in the innovation industries.214
Second, patent licensing entities are accused of delaying patent
issuance, holding out on licensing negotiations, and ambushing
manufacturers by waiting for them to become invested in the technology,
thus increasing the technology's value and royalty rate. 215 There are three
reasons why none of these concerns are applicable to formerly
manufacturing entities.
First, formerly manufacturing entities are unlikely to delay patent ·
issuance, as they are generally the commercializing entity at the time the
patent is being prosecuted. 216 At that juncture, there is no benefit in delay
because the property rights are available only after the patent issues. This
is evidenced by the fact that not one of the companies studied in this
Article has ever delayed or been accused of delaying the issuance of any of
their patents.
Second, formerly manufacturing entities are unlikely to delay licensing
negotiations. As illustrated in the case studies, formerly manufacturing
entities rarely switch from a manufacturing business model to a licensing
business model overnight. Instead, they attempted to license their
technology with ongoing manufacturing activities, and some even continue
212

Dudas & Kline, supra note 115, at 5-6.
See Patent Licensing Principles, CONVERSANT IP (2013), http://www.conversantip.com/ wpcontent/uploads/Conversant-Patent-Licensing-Principles.pdf (offering ten principles that should serve
as the basis of ethical and beneficial patent licensing).
214
See id. ("[L]icensors and licensees alike must act ethically, responsibly, knowledgeably and
with rigor to achieve mutual benefit and economic growth.").
215
See John R. Allison et al., Patent Quality and Settlement Among Repeat Patent Litigants, 99
GEO. L.J. 677, 683 (2011) (accusing licensing entities of"hiding under a bridge" and "demanding tolls
from surprised passersby''); Lemley & Melamed, supra note 13, at 2165 ("[Patent trolls] defer licensing
discussions until technology users have developed and invested in products that include the patented
technologies and are thus less able to switch to alternatives.").
216
See Risch, Patent Troll Myths, supra note 173, at 486 (finding that many sources of nonpracticing entity patents were productive companies "attempting to build product or service-based
businesses").
213
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to engage in R&D and manufacturing even after they shift business
models. When they shifted their business model to licensing, the formerly
manufacturing entity may have filed more lawsuits; but this did not cause a
delay that would encourage a competitor to invest in the technology in the
meantime. Considering that the technology was already out in the open
based on the formerly manufacturing entity's attempts to make and sell it,
and that licensing overtures were made by the formerly manufacturing
entity, it is hard to believe that competitors were caught unaware. As to
holdout behavior during licensing negotiations, because formerly
manufacturing entities had already been using the technology, they would
be in a better position to coordinate complementary technology rights to
obtain license fees, rather than holdout and obtain none.
Third, formerly manufacturing entities are unlikely to gain much by
delaying the filing of a patent infringement lawsuit. As made clear in the
discussion about how competitors are not caught unawares, it is nearly
impossible for a formerly manufacturing entity to "sneak up" on a
manufacturing company; the technology was already out in the market in
some way or another. In other words, formerly manufacturing entities do
not hide the ball; rather, they were originally trying to play with the ball
out in the open and are now willing to sell the ball to others who also now
want to play. Thus, contrary to what many now claim, this type of patent
licensing entity poses little to no risk to commercialization.
Finally, in all licensing negotiations, recall that formerly
manufacturing entities may actually be better at this role than those patent
licensing entities that originated entirely from this business model. Since
formerly manufacturing entities either manufactured, or at least attempted
to manufacture, the technology themselves, they are often in a better
position to know the true value of the technology to producers and
consumers. These three points show that the behavior of formerly
manufacturing entities does not reflect the concerns about the bad actors
who clearly meet the complaints about so-called "patent trolls." This
suggests that the "patent troll" rhetoric should be dropped in favor of more
analytically precise terminology that properly identifies the various
commercial entities working in the innovation industries and their
behaviors, including a "formerly manufacturing entity" category. However,
it is possible to take the argument one step further. That is, in some
respects, formerly manufacturing entities are more beneficial than other
types of patent licensing entities.
2. Different from Other Patent Licensing Entities

This Article argues that formerly manufacturing entities are in fact
different from other types of patent licensing entities, and should therefore
be treated accordingly in the patent policy debates. It is important to
understand why these companies are different from other patent licensing
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entities, such as universities and research firms, which are typically
privileged in the public debates, but not always. For instance, the
University of Wisconsin and Carnegie Mellon University have been
accused of being "patent trolls." 217 Still, prominent academics exclude
universities or research firms from the "patent troll" label. 218 When calling
for specialized treatment for a certain type of patent licensing entity, it is
essential to understand what it is we value about formerly manufacturing
entities that is the same and different from other firms that employ the
same business model but are receiving special treatment.
Universities are generally exempt from the "patent troll" label. The
common argument is that they are not "patent trolls" because they add
technological knowledge to society through the research undertaken by
their professors. 219 Since universities are in the education business, not the
manufacturing business, they generally license their homegrown
technology, hoping to generate revenue. 220 But while they do license,
universities often try to avoid litigation, both because of monetary cost and
non-monetary risks, such as alienating potential donors. 221 However,
universities do sometimes litigate to protect their investments, support
217
See Erin Fuchs, Tech 's 8 Most Fearsome 'Patent Trolls', Bus. INSIDER (Nov. 25, 2012, 2:01
PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/biggest-patent-holding-companies-2012-11?op=1 (identifying
and compiling a list of patent trolls based on the number of each entity's patents and publicized patent
applications as of July 2012); Mike Masnick, Patent Trolling Carnegie Mellon Wins What Could Be
Largest Patent Verdict Ever: $1.2 Billion, TECHDIRT (Dec. 27, 2012, 9:55 AM), https://www.techdirt
.com/articles/20121226/ 175 82221493/patent-trolling-camegie-mellon-wins-what-could-be-largest-pate
nt-verdict-ever-12-billion.shtml (accusing Carnegie Mellon University of never licensing its infringed
patents and just "s[itting] on [them] and su[ing]").
218
See, e.g., Chien, Of Trolls, Davids & Goliaths, supra note 28, at 1577-78 ("[Patent trolls]
exclude actors in the innovation enterprise who engage in significant research and development
activities ...."); Merges, supra note 210, at 1586 n.7 (stating that "any reasonable definition of a troll
would exclude" a prolific inventor and innovator); Dennis Crouch, What is a Patent Troll?, PATENTLY0 (May 12, 2006), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2006/05/what_is_a_paten.html (excluding entities who
do research and development).
219
See, e.g., Jeremiah S. Helm, Comment, Why Pharmaceutical Firms Support Patent Trolls: The
Disparate Impact of eBay v. MercExchange on Innovation, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH L. REV.
331, 335 (2006) ("The undeniable fact is that universities are active innovators, while patent trolls,
almost by definition, are not. ... [T]his difference is key."); Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent
Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 611, 630 (2008) ("University patent owners
aren't trolls in my view when they contribute previously unknown technology to society, rather than
just imposing costs on others by obtaining and asserting legal rights over inventions independently
developed by others.").
220
See, e.g., Jay P. Kesan, Transferring Innovation, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2169, 2169 (2013)
(arguing that universities are interested in "generating licensing income and obtaining reimbursement
for legal expenses").
221
See, e.g., Jacob H. Rooksby, Innovation & Litigation: Tensions Between Universities and
Patents and How to Fix Them, 15 YALE J.L. & TECH. 312, 318 (2013) ("University involvement as
plaintiffs in patent infringement lawsuits ... has the potential to alienate donors, upset politicians with
ties to defendants, and potentially cause universities to be seen as undermining their public-service
values.").
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commercialization by their licensees, and generate revenue. 222 In the same
vein, research firms do not manufacture or sell their inventions; instead,
they develop knowledge and technology to license or sell to manufacturing
firms.223
Formerly manufacturing entities share some features with universities
and research firms that are deigned to be given privileged status as
licensing entities. Specifically, formerly manufacturing entities have
shown their adeptness at research and development in creating the patented
technology that they used to manufacture or sell. Further, formerly
manufacturing entities often use their licensing revenue to research and
develop new technology. Consider, for example, Conversant. Although it
no longer manufacturers its DRAM chips, it is doing significant research
and development of new flash memory technologies. 224 Similarly,
Immersion continues to develop and expand its haptic technology
applications. 225 Like universities and research entitles, formerly
manufacturing entities license their technology to other companies for
them to manufacture and sell. And like universities and research entities,
formerly manufacturing entities also prefer to negotiate licenses rather than
litigate.
Formerly manufacturing entities have at least one advantage over
universities, research entities, and licensing entities in being carved out of
the "patent troll" label with a privileged status. As mentioned above, there
is additional information to be gained through the commercial embodiment
of an idea. 226 Although the United States has not returned to the "paper
patent doctrine" at the request of many scholars, an actual marketed
embodiment of a new idea offers more informational value to both
competitors in the marketplace and to follow-on researchers than the
inscrutable legalese of a patent. There should not be privileged grants of
status to entities that employ the same business model (licensing). But if
academics and commentators are going to do so in asserting the extent and
scope of the purported "patent troll" problem, and legislatures go so far as
222
See id. at 318-319 ("Universities might litigate to protect their investments in patents, to
support commercialization efforts by their licensees, or even-perhaps controversially-to generate
revenue.").
223
See Penin, supra note 25, at 634 ("Technological firms (often called fabless firms) ... produce
knowledge and new technologies that they then sell to manufacturing firms ... which use them to
develop, produce, and sell tangible goods.").
224
See supra Section III.8.1 (discussing how after Conversant stopped manufacturing its DRAM
chips it continued extensive research and development in creating a new flash memory technology
called HLNAND).
225
See supra Section III.8.3 (discussing how immersion has invested its licensing royalties and
patent infringement spoils in ongoing research and development efforts to refine its haptics
technology).
226
See supra note 197 and accompanying text (arguing that heightened disclosure requirements to
the PTO would improve the teaching function of patents).

478

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:435

to write such distinctions into law, then formerly manufacturing entities
have as much claim to be treated at least as well as universities and
research entities.
3. Recommendations
To be sure, no legal system is flawless, and this includes the patent
system. Moreover, there are bad actors in every legal field, including the
patent system. 227 However, trying to solve those problems by consolidating
all patent licensing entities together without looking at the demonstrably
different types, behaviors, or effects of the different types of licensing
entities is imprudent. 228 Not all patent licensing entities engage in the bad
behaviors often associated with so-called "patent trolls." Thus, proposals to
revise the patent system, including the licensing and litigation rules, should
not treat it as a singular issue.
In this respect, formerly manufacturing entities are significant. These
companies look more like universities and research firms given their
extensive research and development and active licensing of their
technologies. This particular type of licensing entity may actually be more
useful than universities and research entities. Although formerly
manufacturing entities no longer directly bring their own invented
technology to market, they do commercialize the technology in positive
ways that go above and beyond what universities and research entities do.
If the majority of patent licensing entities are formerly manufacturing
entities,229 then this strongly suggests rethinking the push for broad-ranging
revisions to the patent system, such as fee shifting provisions, based on
equally broad-brushed pejorative attacks on patent licensing entities.
Instead, proper reforms can and should target the specific bad actors that
do exist, such as the entities that send deceptive and misleading demand
letters. 230
227
For the purposes of this Article, the author takes no particular position on other types of patent
licensing entities and the legitimacy of their behaviors under the law.
228
See, e.g., Penin, supra note 25, at 638 (calling for a patent system designed to limit the harm of
bad "patent troll" behavior without harming the positive functionality of good patent trolls).
229
See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
230
See Targeting Rogue and Opaque Letters {TROL) Act of 2014, Discussion Draft of May 15,
2014, H.R. _ , I 13th Cong. (2014), available at http://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IFI 7/20140522/
I 02255/HHRG- l l 3-IF 17-20 l 40522-SD002.pdf (proposing to make "certain bad faith communications
in connection with the assertion of a United States patent" unfair or deceptive acts or practices); Terry
Unveils Draft Legislation to Address Abusive Patent Demand Letters, U.S. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES ENERGY & COMMERCE COMMITTEE (May 15, 2014), http://energycommerce.house
.gov/press-release/terry-unveils-draft-legislation-address-abusive-patent-demand-letters ("[The TROL
Act] aims to protect businesses from abusive patent assertion entities (PAEs), or patent trolls [by
requiring] patent demand letters to include certain basic information to help companies determine
whether a letter is legitimate."); see also Targeting Rogue and Opaque Letters (TROL) Act of 2014,
Discussion Draft of July 7, 2014, H.R.
_ , I 13th
Cong. (2014), available at
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V. CONCLUSION
This Article challenges two central assumptions in the conventional
wisdom about the patent licensing business model. First, not all patent
licensing entities are the same. Licensing in various forms has been a key
feature of the American patent system for over two hundred years and
reflects core patent policy. Second, given that not all patent licensing
entities are the same, patent licensing does not necessarily harm
commercialization or innovation; in fact, patent licensing is an archetype
of commercialization itself. Thus, when assessing patent licensing entities,
it is necessary to identify where these companies come from and how they
behave, rather than classifying them· based on misleading and undefined
rhetoric.
In fact, one type of patent licensing entity-the formerly
manufacturing entity-contradicts almost all of the allegations targeted at
the bad behaviors of so-called "patent trolls." Yet, they are included within
the scope of this pejorative label. As the case studies in this Article reveal,
formerly manufacturing entities commercialize patented innovation and
reflect the very policies justifying the securing of patents to the owners of
new and useful technology. While further study is needed, this Article
belies the claims that all "patent trolls" are alike and that they are all
harmful to innovation. To the contrary, the formerly manufacturing
entity-probably the most widespread and dominant patent licensing entity
that exists-creates numerous benefits for both the commercialization of
new technology and the ongoing development of new innovation.

http://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IFl 7/20140709/102466/BILLS-1l3HR_ih-Ul .pdf
original May 15, 2014 proposal with minor amendments and changes).
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